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Abstract
In this work we study the effect of rounds of interaction on the common randomness gen-
eration (CRG) problem. In the CRG problem, two parties, Alice and Bob, receive samples Xi
and Yi, respectively, where (Xi, Yi) are drawn jointly from a source distribution µ. The two
parties wish to agree on a common random key consisting of many bits of randomness, by ex-
changing messages that depend on each party’s respective input and the previous messages. In
this work we study the amortized version of the problem, i.e., the number of bits of commu-
nication needed per random bit output by Alice and Bob, in the limit as the number of bits
generated tends to infinity. The amortized version of the CRG problem has been extensively
studied in the information theory literature, though very little was known about the effect of
interaction on this problem. Recently Bafna et al. (SODA 2019) considered the non-amortized
version of the problem (so here the goal of the interaction is to generate a fixed number of
random bits): they gave a family of sources µr,n parameterized by r, n ∈ N, such that with r+2
rounds of communication one can generate n bits of common randomness with this source with
O(r log n) communication, whereas with roughly r/2 rounds the communication complexity is
Ω(n/poly log n). Note in particular that their source is designed with the target number of bits
in mind and hence the result does not apply to the amortized setting.
In this work we strengthen the work of Bafna et al. in two ways: First we show that the
results extend to the classical amortized setting. We also reduce the gap between the round
complexity in the upper and lower bounds to an additive constant. Specifically we show that for
every pair r, n ∈ N the (amortized) communication complexity to generate Ω(n) bits of common
randomness from the source µr,n using r+ 2 rounds of communication is O(r log n) whereas the
amortized communication required to generate the same amount of randomness from r rounds is
Ω(
√
n). Our techniques exploit known connections between information complexity and CRG,
and the main novelty is our ability to analyze the information complexity of protocols getting
inputs from the source µr,n.
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Figure 1: Common randomness generation.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the problem of common randomness generation (CRG) and the companion
problem of secret key generation (SKG). In each of these problems, there are two parties Alice
and Bob, who are given several samples of correlated randomness: Alice is given random variables
X1, X2, . . ., and Bob is given random variables Y1, Y2, . . ., where the pairs (Xi, Yi) are distributed
i.i.d. according to some distribution µ. In the CRG problem (Figure 1), the goal of Alice and Bob is
to agree, with high probability, on some shared key K of high entropy by communicating as little as
possible. In the SKG problem, they have the additional secrecy requirement that an eavesdropper
Eve who observes their transcript of communication cannot determine much information on K.
The problems of CRG and SKG were introduced independently by Maurer [Mau91, Mau92,
Mau93] and by Ahlswede and Csisza´r [AC93, AC98]. An important motivation for their work was
from cryptography, where the posession of a shared secret key allows parties to securely trans-
mit information using a private-key cryptosystem. Rather than generating private keys based
on computational hardness assumptions, as in [DH76, RSA78], these works suggested the study
of secret key generation from an information-theoretic viewpoint, under information-theoretic as-
sumptions such as access to a correlated source. Subsequently techniques similar to those de-
veloped in [Mau93, AC93], such as privacy amplification, have been used in work on quantum
key agreement [BBB+92, HAD+95]. Shared common randomness, and the generation thereof,
has also found additional applications in identification capacity [AD89b, AD89a], communication
complexity [CGMS17, GKS15, GS17, BGI14], locality-sensitive hashing, [GJ18] and coding theory
[BBT60, CN91].
The initial introduction of CRG and SKG by Maurer, Ahlswede, and Csisza´r was in the amor-
tized setting, which has since been studied in many works (such as [CN00, CN04, ZC11, Tya13,
LCV15, Liu16, LCV17, Ye05, GA10a, GA10b]). In this setting, given a source of correlation µ, the
goal is to characterize the “achievability region”, i.e., those pairs (C,L) of non-negative real num-
bers, such that if Alice and Bob receive N i.i.d. copies of the inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µ, by communicating
roughly C ·N bits, they can generate nearly L ·N bits of common randomness (or secret key) with
probability approaching 1 as N →∞; a formal definition is presented in Definitions 2.1 and 2.2.
In the theoretical computer science community the non-amortized setting of CRG has also been
extensively studied. In this setting, Alice and Bob still receive some number N of i.i.d. samples
from the source µ, but the communication and key length do not have to grow linearly with the
number of samples, and the probability of agreeing on a key need not approach 1. This problem was
first studied in its zero-communication variant, where it is also known as non-interactive correlation
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distillation, and in the setting where Alice and Bob wish only to agree on a single bit, by Gacs
and Ko¨rner [GK73] and Witsenhausen [Wit75], as well as later works [MO05, MOR+06, Yan07].
Bogdanov and Mossel [BM11] and Chan et al. [CMN14] study the version where Alice and Bob wish
to agree on many bits, again in the zero-communication setting. Finally, several more recent works
[CGMS17, GR16, GJ18] have studied the non-amortized version of CRG where communication is
allowed. These latter works generally study relatively simple sources, such as the bivariate Gaussian
source (BGS) and the binary symmetric source (BSS). 1
1.1 Overview of main results: does interaction help?
Despite the large amount of work on CRG and SKG in the last several decades, until recently, very
little was known about the role of interaction in these problems. While initial work in the area
[AC93, AC98] studied only 1-round and 2-round protocols, recent works [LCV15, Liu16, LCV17]
have generalized those initial results to multi-round protocols; however, until our work, it was not
known in the amortized setting if increasing the number of rounds of some r-round protocol can
actually allow the parties to communicate less (and generate random keys of the same length).
This question of whether Alice and Bob can reduce the communication cost of their protocol
at the expense of increasing the number of rounds is central to our work. Curiously, for the
amortized setting, the answer to this question is negative in several cases: for instance, when
(X,Y ) is distributed according to the binary symmetric source (BSS) or the bivariate Gaussian
source (BGS), Liu et al. [LCV17] and Tyagi [Tya13] showed that increasing the number of rounds
does not help to reduce communication cost. In terms of separation results, Tyagi [Tya13] presented
a source on a ternary alphabet for which a 1-round protocol has smaller communication cost than
any 2-round protocol by a constant factor, and this is the only known round-based separation in
the amortized setting.
Orlitsky [Orl90, Orl91] studied a slightly different version of CRG in which the key K is required
to be equal to Alice’s input X; thus the problem becomes that of Bob learning Alice’s input.
Orlitsky showed (in the non-amortized case) that 2-round protocols can require exponentially less
communication than 1-round protocols. However, for any r > 2, he showed that r-round protocols
can save on communication cost over 2-round protocols by at most a factor of 4. This version of
the problem was also studied in the amortized case by Ma and Ishwar [MI08], who showed that
interaction does not help at all; in fact, the 1-round protocol that achieves minimum communication
cost is simply given by Slepian-Wolf coding [CT12].
The most relevant work is that of Bafna et al. [BGGS18], who showed the following in the
non-amortized setting (see [BGGS18, Theorems 1.1 & 1.2]): for any fixed r, there are sufficiently
large n such that for some source µ = µr,n, we have:
• Alice and Bob can generate secret keys of length n with r + 2 rounds of communication and
O(log n) communication cost;
• When restricted to b(r + 1)/2c rounds, any protocol which generates common random keys
of length n must have communication cost n/ logω(1) n.
1For a parameter p ∈ [0, 1], the binary symmetric source BSSp is the one where X,Y are bits that are each
uniformly distributed in {0, 1} and such that PBSSp [X 6= Y ] = p. For ρ ∈ [−1, 1], the bivariate Gaussian source BGSρ
is the one where X,Y ∈ R are individually distributed as standard Gaussians and that EBGSρ [XY ] = ρ.
2
Notice that the above result is not tight in the dependence on the number of rounds; a tight result
(up to polylogarithmic factors) would state that any (r + 1)-round protocol must have commu-
nication cost n/ logω(1) n. More significantly, the result does not establish any separation in the
amortized setting, which is the main target of this paper.
Our results Our main result is an extension of the above results of Bafna et al. [BGGS18] to the
amortized setting. Along the way we also get a nearly tight dependence on the number of rounds
(losing a quadratic factor in communication cost and a single additional round of communication).
In particular, we show:
• For the source µ = µr,n mentioned above, any protocol with at most r rounds and which gen-
erates common random keys of length n must have communication cost at least
√
n/ logω(1) n.
(See Theorem 2.2 for a formal statement.)
• Moreover, an identical rounds-communication tradeoff holds for the amortized case. (See
Theorem 2.3.)
We emphasize that the second result above gives the first rounds-communication tradeoff for the
amortized case (apart from the constant-factor separation between 1-round and 2-round protocols
given by Tyagi [Tya13]).
Technical Challenge At a very high level the source in [BGGS18] is built around the concept of
“pointer-chasing problems” that are well-known to lead to separations in round-complexity [NW93,
DGS84, PS82]. The main contribution in their work is to show how the hardness of pointer chasing
(or a variation they consider) translates to the hardness of generating common randomness in their
source.
Getting an amortized lower bound turns out to be significantly more challenging. For one thing
we can no longer build a source that is crafted around a targeted length of the common random
string. Indeed this ability allows Bafna et al. [BGGS18] to focus on the case where the two players
get a single copy of the randomness (X,Y ) ∼ µ, and the core of their negative result is showing
that r/2 rounds of communication are insufficient to generate any non-trivial randomness from this
single copy (“non-trivial” meaning more than the number of bits communicated). In the amortized
case such results are not possible: if there is a protocol with small communication and many rounds
getting some amount of randomness, then we can simulate the protocol with large communication
in two rounds, and then (here using the ability to amortize) we can scale back the communuication
and generate proportionately less, but non-trivial amounts of randomness. Thus no matter how
small the amortized communication budget is, it is always possible to get some non-trivial amounts
of randomness. So our lower bounds really need to address a “direct product” version of the pointer
chasing question.
Indeed, the idea of our proof is to “reduce to the non-amortized case” by using similar types of
techniques that have been applied to show direct sum and direct product results for the commu-
nication complexity of functions [CSWY01, JRS03, HJMR07, BBCR13, JPY12, BR11, BRWY13].
However, the task of CRG is “more flexible” than that of computing a function as there is no pre-
scribed output for given inputs, so implementing this reduction is nontrivial. Roughly, our results
have to analyze notions such as the internal and external information complexity of all bounded
round protocols (and show that these are close) whereas most of the previous use in communication
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complexity lower bounds only needed to work with protocols that computed a specific function.
We go into further details on this in Section 2.6 after we get more specific about the sources we
consider and the kind of results we seek.
Organization of this paper In Section 2 we formally introduce the problems of CRG and SKG
(in both the non-amortized and amortized settings) and state our main results. Section 3 presents
the proof of our main results in the non-amortized setting, and Sections 4 and 5 present the proof
of our main results in the amortized setting. Section 6 collects several basic information theoretical
lemmas used throughout the paper.
2 Background and Overview of Main Results
2.1 Notation
We first describe some of the basic notational conventions we use throughout the paper. We use
capital script font, such as S,X ,Y, to denote sets, and capital letters, such as X,Y, Z, to denote
random variables. We typically use the letters µ, ν,D to denote distributions. Sn denotes the set
of all permutations on [n].
Basic probability If E ⊂ X is some event, then we will write 1[X ∈ E ] to denote the random
variable that is 1 if X ∈ E , and 0 otherwise. We will slightly abuse notation, e.g., if (X,Y ) ∼ ν then
1[X = Y ] is 1 when X = Y and 0 otherwise. If f : X → R, then Eµ[f(X)] denotes the expectation
of f(X) when X is distributed according to µ. For E ⊂ X , Pµ[E ] := Eµ[1[X ∈ E ]] is the probability
that X ∈ E when X ∼ µ. We will omit the subscript µ if the distribution is obvious. This notation
extends naturally to conditional expectations.
Total variation distance & KL divergence For random variables X,Y distributed according
to µ, ν, respectively, on a finite set X , ∆(µ, ν) := 12
∑
x∈X |Pµ[X = x] − Pν [Y = x]| denotes the
total variational distance between X and Y . For distributions µ and ν supported on a set X ,
the KL divergence between µ, ν, denoted KL(µ||ν), is given by, for X ∼ µ, Y ∼ ν, KL(µ||ν) :=∑
x∈X P[X = x] · log
(
P[X=x]
P[Y=x]
)
. We will often abuse notation when denoting KL divergences or total
variation distances: for X ∼ µ, Y ∼ ν supported on a set X , we will write ∆(X,Y ) = ∆(µ, ν) and
KL(X||Y ) = KL(µ||ν).
Information theory If X ∼ µ, then the entropy of X is given by Hµ(X) = H(X) =
Ex∼µ[log(1/Pµ[X = x])]. Now suppose (X,Y ) are random variables with X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y jointly dis-
tributed according to some distribution ν. Letting Xy denote the random variable distributed
as X, conditioned on Y = y, then H(X|Y = y) := H(Xy). Then the conditional entropy
Hµ(X|Y ) = H(X|Y ) is given by H(X|Y ) =: Ey∼ν [H(X|Y = y)]. The mutual information is given
by Iµ(X;Y ) = I(X;Y ) := H(X) − H(X|Y ); it is well-known that I(X;Y ) = H(Y ) − H(Y |X).
If (X,Y, Z) are jointly distributed according to some distribution, then the conditional mutual
information I(X;Y |Z) is given by I(X;Y |Z) := H(X|Z)−H(X|Y,Z).
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Multiple random variables For random variables (X,Y ) ∼ µ distributed jointly, we will often
use XY ∈ X × Y to denote the pair. The marginals X ∼ µX , Y ∼ µY are the distributions on
X and Y, respectively, given by PX∼µX [X = x] := PXY∼µ[X = x], and similarly for µY . Then
X ⊗Y ∈ X ×Y denotes the random variable distributed according to the product of the marginals
µX⊗µY . For a sequence of random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xi, . . ., for any j ≥ 1, we let Xj denote the
tuple (X1, . . . , Xj), and for 1 ≤ j ≤ j′, let Xj
′
j denote the tuple (Xj , Xj+1, . . . , Xj′). Two common
usages of this notation are as follows: (1) for N ∈ N, and a distribution Z ∼ µ, the random
variable distributed according to N i.i.d. copies of µ is denoted as ZN = (Z1, . . . , ZN ) ∼ µ⊗N ;
(2) if Π1, . . . ,Πt denote the first t messages in a communication protocol (see Section 2.2), then
Πt = (Π1,Π2, . . . ,Πt).
2.2 Communication protocols
We follow the standard setup of interactive communication protocols [Yao79], and mostly follow
the notational conventions of [BBCR13, BR11]. There are finite sets X ,Y, and parties Alice and
Bob, who receive inputs X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y, respectively. Depending on the setting, Alice and Bob
may additionally have access to private coins RA, RB, respectively, and public coins RPub. Formally,
RA, RB, RPub may be interpreted as infinite strings of independently and uniformly distributed ran-
dom bits.
An interactive r-round protocol Π consists of a sequence of r messages, Π1, . . . ,Πr ∈ {0, 1}∗
that Alice and Bob alternatively send to each other, with Alice sending the first message Π1.
The messages Π1, . . . ,Πr are also referred to as the rounds of the protocol, and each message is
a deterministic function of the previous messages, one party’s input, and any randomness (public
and/or private) available to that party. For 1 ≤ t ≤ r with t odd, we will write Alice’s message
Πt as Πt = Πt(X,RA, RPub,Π
t−1) if the protocol can use public and private coins (with obvious
modifications if public and/or private coins are not available), and for t even, Bob’s message Πt as
Πt = Πt(Y,RB, RPub,Π
t−1).2 The communication cost of Π, denoted by CC(Π), is the maximum of∑r
t=1 |Πt|, taken over all inputs X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y, and all settings of the random coins RA, RB, RPub
(if applicable). The tuple consisting of all the messages, i.e., Πr = (Π1, . . . ,Πr), is referred to as
the transcript of the protocol Π.
2.3 Rate regions for amortized CRG & SKG
Recall that in amortized CRG, Alice and Bob receive some large number N of copies (X,Y ) from
the source, are allowed to communicate some number of bits that grows linearly with N , and must
agree upon a key whose entropy grows linearly with N with probability tending to 1 as N → ∞.
The word “amortized” refers to the fact that the communication and key entropy both grow linearly
with N . The parties may use private but not public coins (as with access to public randomness,
there would be no need to generate a shared random string). Definition 2.1 below follows the
exposition of Liu et al. [LCV17].
Definition 2.1 (Amortized common randomness generation (CRG)). A tuple (C,L) is r-achievable
for CRG for a source distribution (X,Y ) ∼ ν if for every N ∈ N, there is some N with N → 0 as
2It is required that for each t and each instiantion of Πt−1, the set of possible values of Πt (over all possible
instantiaions of X,Y,RA, RB, RPub) must be prefix-free. This technical detail, which is introduced so that each party
knows when to “start speaking” when the other finishes, will not be important for us.
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N →∞, a key set KN , and a private-coin protocol Π = Π(N) that takes as input (XN , Y N ) ∼ ν⊗N ,
such that if Π(N)t ∈ {0, 1}∗ denotes the message sent in the t-th round of Π(N), 1 ≤ t ≤ r, and
KA = KA(N),KB = KB(N) ∈ KN denote the output keys of Alice and Bob for the protocol Π(N),
then:
1. lim supN→∞
1
N · CC(Π(N)) ≤ C.
2. lim infN→∞ 1N log |KN | ≥ L.
3. Letting KN be the random variable that is uniformly distributed on KN , then
∆((KA(N)KB(N)), (KNKN )) ≤ N .
In particular, there exists a coupling of KA(N)KB(N) with KNKN such that P[KA(N) =
KB(N) = KN ] ≥ 1 − N → 1 as N → ∞. (To be clear, KNKN denotes the tuple (KN ,KN )
which is distributed uniformly on the set {(k, k) : k ∈ KN}.)
We denote the subset of pairs (C,L) ⊂ R2≥0 that are r-achievable from the source (X,Y ) ∼ ν by
Tr(X,Y ); this set Tr(X,Y ) is known as the achievable rate region for r-round CRG (or simply rate
region, with r and the task of CRG implicit) for the source µ.
To interpret Definition 2.1, notice that C denotes the communication of the protocols Π = Π(N),
whereas L (approximately) gives the entropy of the key produced.
Corresponding to Definition 2.1 for CRG we have the following Definition 2.2 for SKG in the
amortized setting:
Definition 2.2 (Amortized SKG). A tuple (C,L) is r-achievable for SKG for a distribution ν if
there is some choice of a sequence N → 0 such that the following holds: for each N ∈ N there is
some choice of private coin protocol3 Π = Π(N) such that, first, items 1 and 2 of Definition 2.1 are
satisfied for these N ,Π(N), N , and, second,
∆(KA(N)KB(N)Π(N)
r,KNKN ⊗Π(N)r) ≤ N . (1)
As in Definition 2.1, KN denotes the random variable that is uniform on on KN ; notice that (1)
above implies item 3 of Definition 2.1.
We denote the set of pairs (C,L) that are r-achievable for SKG from ν by Sr(X,Y ).
It is clear from the definition that r-achievability for SKG is a stronger requirement than r-
achievability for CRG; that is, for every source (X,Y ) ∼ ν, we have Sr(X,Y ) ⊂ Tr(X,Y ). It is
also well-known [LCV17, Han03] that both Tr(X,Y ) and Sr(X,Y ) are closed subsets of R2.
2.4 Non-Amortized Setting
The non-amortized setting is similar to the amortized setting, in that Alice and Bob receive arbi-
trarily many i.i.d. samples of (X,Y ) ∼ µ, except the entropy of their key and their communication
no longer grow linearly with the number of samples. Rather, the keys lie in some fixed set K,
and the goal is to use as little communication (and rounds) as possible to generate a single key
uniformly distributed in K. Moreover, whereas the agreement probability 1− N in the amortized
3As for CRG, the protocol Π cannot use public coins.
6
case was assumed to approach 1 asymptotically, in the non-amortized case, it is often of interest
to study settings in which the parties may disagree with some probability that is bounded away
from 0. In fact, this probability of disagreement may be arbitrarily close to 1. The non-amortized
setting has recently received much attention among the theoretical computer science community
[BM11, CGMS17, GR16, GJ18, BGGS18], where it is also known as the agreement distillation
problem.
In the below definition we assume that (X,Y ) ∼ ν and ν is supported on a set X × Y.
Definition 2.3 (Non-amortized common randomness generation). For r, C ∈ N, and L,  ∈ R≥0,
we say that the tuple (C,L, ) is r-achievable from the source ν (for CRG) if there is some N ∈ N
and an r-round protocol Π with private randomness that takes as input (XN , Y N ) ∼ ν⊗N , such
that at the end of Π, Alice and Bob output keys KA,KB ∈ K given by deterministic functions
KA = KA(X
N , RA,Π
r), KB = KB(Y
N , RB,Π
r), such that:
1. CC(Π) ≤ C.
2. |K| ≥ 2L.
3. There is a random variable K uniformly distributed on K such that Pν [K = KA = KB] ≥ 1−.
As in the amortized case, for tuples (C,L, ), observe that C denotes communication and L
denotes entropy.
Definition 2.3 differs slightly from the definition of achievable rates for non-amortized CRG in
[BM11, CGMS17, GR16, GJ18, BGGS18], which do not limit the size of the key space K, but rather
require a lower bound on the min-entropy of each of KA,KB. We present this latter definition in
Appendix A (Definition A.1) and show that it is essentially equivalent to Definition 2.3.
As in the amortized setting, in the non-amortized setting secret key generation is the same as
common randomness generation except the key is additionally required to be “almost independent”
from the transcript of the protocol:
Definition 2.4 (Non-amortized secret key generation). For r, C ∈ N and L ∈ R≥0, , δ ∈ [0, 1), we
say that the tuple (C,L, , δ) is r-achievable from the source ν (for SKG) if the tuple (C,L, ) is
r-achievable for CRG from the source ν, and if there exists a protocol Π = (Π1, . . . ,Πr) achieving
the tuple such that
I(Πr;KAKB) ≤ δ. (2)
Notice that condition (2) is quite strong: it implies, for instance, that ∆(ΠrKAKB,Π
r⊗KAKB) ≤√
δ/2, by Pinsker’s inequality.
2.5 Main Results: Analogue of Pointer-Chasing Separations for CRG & SKG
In this section we present our main results. We first state formally the main result of [BGGS18]
discussed in Section 1.1, which establishes an exponential separation in communication cost between
b(r + 1)/2c-round protocols and (r + 2)-round protocols in the non-amortized setting:
Theorem 2.1 (Thms. 1.1 & 1.2 of [BGGS18]). For each r ∈ N,  ∈ [0, 1), there exists η > 0,
β < ∞, n0 ∈ N such that for any n ≥ n0 and any ` ∈ N, there is a source µr,n,` such that, in the
non-amortized setting:
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(1) The tuple ((r + 2)dlog ne, `, 0, 0) is (r + 2)-achievable for SKG from µr,n,` (and thus ((r +
2)dlog ne, `, 0) is (r + 2)-achievable for CRG).
(2) For any L ∈ N and C ≤ min{ηL−β, n/ logβ n}, the tuple (C,L, ) is not b(r+1)/2c-achievable
for CRG (and thus the tuple (C,L, , δ) is not b(r + 1)/2c-achievable for all δ ≥ 0).
The interpretation of the parameters n, ` in Theorem 2.1 is described in detail in Definition 3.1
of the source µr,n,`. We remark that the proof of item (1) of the theorem is immediate once this
definition is made, and so the main content of Theorem 2.1 is in the second item (i.e., the lower
bound).
To aid understanding of Theorem 2.1, fix any r ∈ N,  ∈ [0, 1), and consider parameters ` =
n→∞; the length of Alice’s and Bob’s inputs under µr,n,n are O(n2). The theorem gives that with
only O(log n) communication, n bits of entropy can be generated in r + 2 rounds, but if we have
only roughly half as many rounds (i.e., b(r+ 1)/2c rounds) then generating n bits of entropy takes
at least n/poly log n communication, which is exponentially larger than log n. It follows that for
some r′ with b(r + 1)/2c ≤ r′ < r + 2, the ratio in communication cost between the best r′-round
protocol and the best (r′ + 1)-round protocol is at least n1/(1+d(r+1)/2e)/ logω(1) n. Our first main
result improves this ratio to n1/4/ logω(1) n and moreover shows that such an r′ lies in {r, r + 1}:
Theorem 2.2 (Tighter round dependence than Theorem 2.1; non-amortized setting). For each
r ∈ N,  ∈ [0, 1), there exists η > 0, β < ∞, n0 ∈ N such that for any n ≥ n0 and any ` ∈ N, the
source µr,n,` of Theorem 2.1 satisfies:
(1) The tuple ((r + 2)dlog ne, `, 0, 0) is (r + 2)-achievable for SKG from µr,n,` (and thus ((r +
2)dlog ne, `, 0) is r-achievable for CRG).
(2) For any L ∈ N, C ≤ min{ηL−β,√n/ logβ n}, the tuple (C,L, ) is not r-achievable for CRG
from µr,n,` (and thus for any δ ≥ 0, the tuple (C,L, , δ) is not r-achievable for SKG).
Our second main result provides an exact analogue of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 for the amortized
setting:
Theorem 2.3 (Amortized setting). For each r ∈ N, γ ∈ (0, 1), there is a constant c0 > 0 such that
for n ≥ c0, the source µr,n,` of Theorem 2.1 satisfies:
(1) The tuple ((r + 2)dlog ne, `) is (r + 2)-achievable for SKG (and thus CRG) from µr,n,`.
(2) Set ` = n. For any C,L ∈ R with C ≤ n/ logc0 n and L > γ` = γn, the tuple (C,L) is not
b(r + 1)/2c-achievable for CRG (and thus for SKG) from µr,n,n.
(3) Again set ` = n. For any C,L ∈ R with C ≤ √n/ logc0 n and L > γn, the tuple (C,L) is not
r-achievable for CRG (and thus for SKG) from µr,n,n.
Notice that parts (2) and (3) of Theorem 2.3 only provide a lower bound on the communication
rate C for protocols when the entropy rate L is at least a constant factor times n. The problem of
determining such a result for L that grow sublinearly with n, or even those L that do not grow at all
(such as L = on(1)) remains open. Such a problem boils down to showing a rounds-communication
tradeoff for the r-round common random bits per interaction bit (CBIB) of the source µr,n,`, or
equivalently, for the r-round strong data processing constant (SDPC) [LCV17]; see Problem 4.7. As
we discuss in Section 4.4, this problem seems to be quite difficult as a proof of it would immediately
imply Theorem 2.3.
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2.6 Discussion and overview of proof of Theorems 2.2 & 2.3
The source µr,n,` referred to in Theorems 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 is a variant of the well-known pointer
chasing distribution from communication complexity [NW93, DGS84, PS82]. This distribution was
introduced to show a similar type of rounds/communication tradeoff as in the above theorems,
except for the task of computing functions rather than generating a shared string.
Alice’s and Bob’s inputs from µr,n,` are given as follows: for an integer n and odd r, Alice receives
permutations indexed by odd integers Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σr : [n] → [n], and Bob receives permutations
indexed by even integers Σ2,Σ4, . . . ,Σr−1 : [n] → [n], as well as an integer I0 ∈ [n]. Let J0 =
Σr(Σr−1(· · ·Σ1(I0))) ∈ [n]. Alice and Bob also receive strings A1, . . . , An ∈ {0, 1}` and B1, . . . , Bn ∈
{0, 1}`, respectively, which are distributed uniformly at random conditioned on AJ0 = BJ0 . If Alice
and Bob have r+ 2 rounds, then the following protocol generates secret keys distributed uniformly
on {0, 1}`: Alice sends Bob I0, who responds with Σ1(I0), Alice responds with Σ2(Σ1(I0)), and so
on, until both parties possess J0, at which point they can output AJ0 = BJ0 .
To prove that Alice and Bob cannot generate shared common random strings with high entropy
and communication n/ logω(1) n (item (2) of Theorem 2.1), the following approach was used: Bafna
et al. [BGGS18] first reduced the problem to showing that Alice and Bob cannot succeed with
high probability on a distributional version of the following communication problem: Alice receives
permutations Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σr : [n]→ [n], an Bob receives permutations Σ2,Σ4, . . . ,Σr−1 : [n]→ [n]
and indices I0, J0 ∈ [n]. Their task is to determine if Σr(Σr−1 · · ·Σ1(I0)) = J0. This problem, called
pointer verification, has a protocol with (r + 5)/2 rounds and communication O(log n), given by
Alice and Bob chasing the pointers forwards and backwards simultaneously. Bafna et al. [BGGS18]
showed however that there is no protocol with (r+3)/2 rounds and communication n/ logω(1) n, and
this led to item (2) of Theorem 2.1. We are able to prove Theorem 2.2 by employing a reduction
from the CRG/SKG problem to the pointer verification problem with indices in [n2] (as opposed
to in [n]) and with 2r permutations (as opposed to r permutations).
The proof of Theorem 2.3 (in particular, of the lower bounds (2) and (3) in the theorem, as (1)
is immediate) is somewhat more involved. The overall goal is to reduce to the non-amortized case
(Theorems 2.1 and 2.2), and to do this, three main ingredients are needed. The first ingredient
is a characterization of the achievable rate region Tr(X,Y ) for CRG in terms of the internal in-
formation cost and external information cost [BBCR13] of private-coin communication protocols,
which has been referred to many times in the literature (e.g., [STW19, GJ18]). This characteriza-
tion shows that that if for L ≤ `, the pair (C,L) is r-achievable for CRG from µr,n,` (i.e., belongs
to Tr(X,Y )), then there is an r-round private-coin protocol Π with inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µr,n,` with
internal information cost at most C and external information cost at least L (see Corollary 4.3).
The second ingredient of the proof is a result of Jain et al. [JPY12] (which is implicit in the
earlier work of Braverman and Rao [BR11]) stating that for any r-round protocol Πˆ with internal
information cost I, there exists an r-round protocol Πˆ′ that simulates Πˆ up to some accuracy loss
 and has communication cost at most I+O(r) (see Theorem 4.4). Applying this to Πˆ = Π, one
might hope to show that Π leads to a protocol with communication O(C) and key length Ω(L)
for non-amortized CRG. However, the error  introduced in the information-to-communication
compression result of Jain et al. [JPY12] makes this conclusion nontrivial, which necessitates the
third ingredient: a delicate argument that makes use of the specific structure of µr,n,` is needed to
complete the reduction (see Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6).
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3 Proof of Theorem 2.2; non-amortized setting
In this section we prove Theorem 2.2. To prove this theorem we need to introduce the pointer chas-
ing source of [BGGS18], and also recall the notion of “indistinguishability” of two distributions to
low-round low-communication protocols. We then state our main technical theorem (Theorem 3.3)
about the indistinguishability of the pointer chasing source from an “independent source” (where
Alice and Bob get inputs that are independent of each other). Section 3.1 is devoted to the proof
of Theorem 3.3.
We begin by formally defining the pointer-chasing source µr,n,` that the theorem uses to achieve
the rounds-communication tradeoff.
Definition 3.1 (The Pointer Chasing Source µr,n,`, [BGGS18], Definition 2.1). For positive integers
r, n and `, the support of µ = µr,n,` is (Sdr/2en ×{0, 1}n`)× ([n]×Sbr/2cn ×{0, 1}n`). Denoting X =
(Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σ2dr/2e−1, A1, . . . , An) and Y = (I,Σ2,Σ4, . . . ,Σ2br/2c, B1, . . . , Bn), a sample (X,Y ) ∼
µ is drawn as follows:
• I ∈ [n] and Σ1, . . . ,Σr ∈ Sn are sampled uniformly and independently.
• Let J = Σr(Σr−1(· · ·Σ1(I) · · · )) ∈ [n].
• AJ = BJ ∈ {0, 1}` is sampled uniformly and independently of I and Σ’s.
• For every k 6= J , Ak ∈ {0, 1}` and Bk ∈ {0, 1}` are sampled uniformly and independently.
We use the following notational convention for samples (X,Y ) ∼ µr,n,`. We write I0 := I, and
for 1 ≤ t ≤ r, It := Σt(It−1). Similarly, we write J0 := J , and for 1 ≤ t ≤ r, Jt−1 = Σ−1t (Jt). Over
the distribution µr,n,`, we thus have It = Jr−t for 0 ≤ t ≤ r with probability 1.
We establish the following basic property of the pointer chasing source µr,n,` for future reference:
Lemma 3.1. When (X,Y ) ∼ µr,n,`, I(X;Y ) = `.
Proof. Notice that H(X) = r log(n!) + n` since Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σ2dr/2e−1 are uniformly random in Sn
and A1, . . . , An are uniformly random in {0, 1}`. Moreover,
H(X|Y ) = H(Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σ2dr/2e−1, A1, . . . , An|Y )
= H(Σ1, . . . ,Σ2dr/2e−1|Y ) +H(A1, . . . , An|Y,Σ1, . . . ,Σ2dr/2e−1)
= r log(n!) + (n− 1)`.
It is immediate from the definition of µr,n,` that part (1) (i.e., the upper bound) of Theorem
2.2 holds: in particular, the parties “chase the pointers”, i.e., alternatively send It, 0 ≤ t ≤ r,
and finally output AIr = BIr as their keys. The main content of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 is then in
part (2) (i.e., the lower bound) of each; its proof, for both theorems, proceeds via arguments about
indistinguishbility of inputs to protocols, which we will now define. For r, C ∈ R+, we say that a
communication protocol Π is an (r, C) protocol if Π has at most brc rounds and communication
cost at most bCc.
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Definition 3.2 (Indistinguishability, [BGGS18], Definition 3.1). Let 0 ≤  ≤ 1. Two distributions
µ1, µ2 on pairs (X,Y ) are -distinguishable to a protocol Π if the distribution of the transcript
Πr when (X,Y ) ∼ µ1 has total variation distance at most  from the distribution of Πr when
(X,Y ) ∼ µ2.
Two distributions µ1, µ2 are (, C, r)-indistinguishable if they are -indistinguishable to ev-
ery (r, C) protocol. The distributions µ1, µ2 are (, C, r)-distinguishable if they are not (, C, r)-
indistinguishable. If Π is a protocol such that the total variation distance of the transcript between
inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µ1 and inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µ2 is at least , then we say that Π distinguishes between
µ1 and µ2 with advantage .
Proposition 3.2 reduces the problem of showing that certain tuples (C,L) are not achievable for
CRG from µr,n,` to that of showing indistinguishability of µr,n,` from the product of its marginals
(µr,n,`)X ⊗ (µr,n,`)Y .
Proposition 3.2 ([BGGS18], Propositions 3.3 & 3.4). There are positive constants η, ξ such that
the following holds. Suppose ρ, C, L ∈ N and 0 < γ < 1. Suppose that C < ηL − 3/2 · log 1/γ − ξ
and that the tuple (C,L, 1− γ) is ρ-achievable for CRG from the source µr,n,`. Then there is some
N ∈ N such that µr,n,N` and (µr,n,N`)X ⊗ (µr,n,N`)Y are (γ/10, C + ξ log 1/γ, ρ+ 1)-distinguishable.
Our main theorem for this section is the following indistiguishability result for µ = µr,n,`
versus µX × µY . In contrast to the analogous result in [BGGS18, Lemma 4.5], our result shows
indistinguishability for protocols with r + 1 rounds albeit with a smaller communication budget.
Theorem 3.3. For every  > 0 and r ∈ N there exists β, n0 such that for every n ≥ n0 and `, the
distributions µ = µr,n,` and µX ⊗ µY are (, r + 1,
√
n/ logβ n)-indistinguishable.
Using Proposition 3.2, the proof of Theorem 2.2 follows from Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. We need to show item (2). Fix  > 0 and r ∈ N. Let ξ, η be the constants
from Proposition 3.2. Also let β0 be the constant β from Theorem 3.3 with (1 − )/20 as the
variational distance parameter. Also let β be a constant such that β > max{β0, 3/2·log 1/(1−)+ξ}
and
√
n/ logβ n + ξ log 1/(1 − ) ≤ √n/ logβ0 n, which is possible for sufficiently large n. Suppose
for purpose of contradiction that for some L > 0, the tuple (min{ηL − β,√n/ logβ n}, L, ) were
r-achievable for CRG from µr,n,`. Since β > 3/2 log 1/(1 − ) + ξ, it follows from Proposition
3.2 that for some N ∈ N, µr,n,`N and (µr,n,`N )X ⊗ (µr,n,`N )Y are ((1 − )/10,
√
n/ logβ0 n, r + 1)-
distinguishable. But this contradictions Theorem 3.3, which states that (µr,n,`N )X ⊗ (µr,n,`N )Y are
((1− )/20,√n/ logβ0 n, r + 1)-indistinguishable.
To complete the proof of Theorem 2.2 it therefore suffices to prove Theorem 3.3. We do so in
the following subsection.
3.1 Disjointness and Proof of Theorem 3.3
Next we work towards the proof of Theorem 3.3; the proof parallels that of a corresponding result of
Bafna et al., which shows that the distributions µ = µr,n,` and µX⊗µY are (, b(r+3)/2c, n/ logβ n)-
indistinguishable (see [BGGS18, Lemma 4.5]). A central ingredient in the proof of [BGGS18] is
a “pointer verification problem” (see Definition 3.3 below) and an indistinguishability result they
show for this problem (see Theorem 3.6). We use the same notion and indistiguishability result,
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with the main difference being that we are able to reduce a “2r”-round pointer verification problem
to our problem whereas the proof in [BGGS18] could only reduce an rround pointer verification
problem to the same. This factor of 2 leads to the gain in this section.
The proof proceeds by eliminating each of two possible strategies Alice and Bob can use to
distinguish µr,n,` and (µr,n,`)X⊗(µr,n,`)Y : first, they can try to follow the chain of pointers, compute
Ir, and check if AIr = BIr (which is true with probability 1 under µr,n,` but only with probability
1/2` under (µr,n,`)X ⊗ (µr,n,`)Y ). Computing Ir, however, with fewer than r + 2 rounds requires
communication Ω(n) by standard results for the pointer chasing problem [NW93]. Alternatively,
Alice and Bob can ignore the chain of pointers and try to determine if there is any i such that
Ai = Bi (under the product distribution the probability that such an i exists is at most n/2
`  1).
As observed in [BGGS18], determining the existence of such an i is no easier than solving the set
disjointness problem [Raz92], which requires communcation Ω(n). However, combining the pointer
chasing and set disjointness lower bounds takes some care, and ultimately leads to the fact that
we are only able to lower-bound the communication cost of r-round (as opposed to (r + 1)-round)
protocols, and get a bound of Ω˜(
√
n) (as opposed to Ω˜(n)). We begin by recalling the Ω(n) lower
bound on the distributional communication complexity of disjointness with respect to a particular
distribution:
Theorem 3.4 ([Raz92]). For every  > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all n the following holds.
Let DisjY = DisjYn (respectively, Disj
N = DisjNn ) denote the uniform distribution on pairs (U, V )
with U, V ⊆ [n] and |U | = |V | = n/4 such that |U ∩ V | = 1 (respectively, |U ∩ V | = 0). Then if
Alice gets U and Bob gets V as inputs, DisjY and DisjN are (, δn, δn)-indistinguishable to Alice
and Bob.
We will use the following corollary of Theorem 3.4:
Corollary 3.5. For every  > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all n the following holds. Let
DisjYn,
√
n (respectively, Disj
N
n,
√
n) denote the uniform distribution on pairs (U, V ) with U, V ⊆ [n]
and |U | = |V | = n/4 such that |U ∩ V | = b√nc (respectively, |U ∩ V | = 0). Then if Alice gets U
and Bob gets V as inputs, DisjYn,
√
n and Disj
N
n,
√
n are (, δ
√
n, δ
√
n)-indistinguishable to Alice and
Bob.
Proof. A protocol Π that distinguishes DisjYn2,n and Disj
N
n2,n with communication C may be con-
verted into a protocol Π′ with communication C that distinguishes DisjYn and Disj
N
n with advantage
. In particular, the protocol Π′ proceeds as follows: given inputs (U, V ), |U | = n/4, |V | = n/4, Al-
ice and Bob construct an instance (U ′, V ′), that is distributed according to DisjYn2,n if (U, V ) ∼ DisjYn
and that is distributed according to DisjNn2,n if (U, V ) ∼ DisjNn . In particular, Alice and Bob first
construct sets (U˜, V˜ ) as follows: for each u ∈ U ⊂ [n], Alice places the elements (u − 1)n + j, for
1 ≤ j ≤ n} in U˜ , and Bob constructs V˜ in an analogous fashion. Then, using public randomness,
they randomly permute the elements of U˜, V˜ (according to the same permutation) to obtain sets
U ′, V ′. It is clear that |U˜ | = |V˜ | = |U ′| = |V ′| = n · |U | = n2/4. Moreover, if |U ∩ V | = 0, then
|U˜ ∩ V˜ | = |U ′ ∩ V ′| = 0, and if |U ∩ V | = 1, then |U ′ ∩ V ′| = n =
√
n2.
By Theorem 3.4, for any  > 0, there is δ > 0 such that the protocol Π′ must have communication
at least δn. Thus the protocol Π must have communication at least δn =
√
δ2n2.
It follows in a similar manner as the above argument that any protocol Π distinguishing DisjYn′,n
and DisjNn′,n with n
2 ≤ n′ < (n + 1)2 with communication C may be converted into a protocol Π′
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with communication C that distinguishes DisjYn and Disj
N
n with advantage . This completes the
proof of the corollary even for non-perfect squares n.
Next we state the second main ingredient in the proof of Theorem 3.3, which is a hardness
result for the pointer verification problem introduced in [BGGS18, Definition 4.1]. The inputs to
pointer verification are similar to those of the standard pointer chasing problem, except that Alice
and Bob receive as inputs a final pointer J0 in addition to the initial pointer I0, and the goal is to
determine if Σr ◦ · · · ◦ Σ1(I0) = J0:
Definition 3.3 ([BGGS18], Definition 4.1). Let r, n ∈ N with r odd. Then the distributions
DYPV = D
Y
PV(r, n) and D
N
PV = D
N
PV(r, n) are both supported on ((Sdr/2n ) × ([n]2 × Sbr/2cn ), and are
defined as follows:
• DNPV is the uniform distribution on ((Sdr/2n )× ([n]2 × Sbr/2cn ).
• (X,Y ) ∼ DYPV, with X = (Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σr), Y = (I0, J0,Σ2,Σ4, . . . ,Σr−1) is sampled by let-
ting Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σr be independent and uniform over Sn, letting I0 ∈ [n] be uniform and
independent of the Σt, and setting J0 = Σr ◦ · · · ◦ Σ1(I0).
Notice that with (r+5)/2 rounds of communication, by communicating at most 1+(r+1)dlog ne
bits, Alice and Bob can distinguish between DYPV(r, n) and D
N
PV(r, n) with advantage 1 − 1/n. In
particular, Alice sends Bob an arbitrary bit in the first round, Bob sends I0, J0 in the second round,
Alice responds with I1 = Σ1(I0) and J1 = Σ
−1
r (J0), Bob responds with I2 and J2, and so on. After
(r + 3)/2 rounds either Alice or Bob will know both I(r−1)/2 and J(r−1)/2, and this person sends
1[Σ(r+1)/2(I(r−1)/2) = J(r−1)/2] (which is 1 with probability 1 under DYPV and only with probability
1/n under DNPV) as the final bit.
Theorem 3.6 states that if Alice and Bob are only allowed 1 fewer round, then they must
communicate exponentially more bits to distinguish DYPV and D
N
PV:
Theorem 3.6 ([BGGS18], Theorem 4.2). For every  > 0 and odd r there exists β, n0 such for
every n ≥ n0, DYPV(r, n) and DNPV(r, n) are (, (r + 3)/2, n/ logβ n)-indistinguishable.
Using Theorem 3.6 and Corollary 3.5, we now prove Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We introduce a new distribution, which we denote by µˆ (or µˆr,n,` when we
want to emphasize dependence on r, n, `); µˆ is a distribution supported on (Sdr/2en × ({0, 1}`)n ×
(Sbr/2cn × [n]× ({0, 1}`)n). We denote a sample from µˆ by (X,Y ), with
X = (Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σ2dr/2e−1, A1, . . . , An), Y = (i,Σ2,Σ4, . . . ,Σ2br/2c, B1, . . . , Bn),
which is distributed as follows:
• I0 ∈ [n] and Σ1, . . . ,Σr ∈ Sn are sampled uniformly and independently. Let Ir = Σr ◦ · · · ◦
Σ1(I0).
• Let P ⊂ [n] be a uniformly random subset of size b√nc, conditioned on the event that it
contains Ir.
• For every j ∈ P , Aj = Bj ∈ {0, 1}L is sampled uniformly and independently of i, Σ’s, and P .
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• For every j 6∈ P , Aj , Bj ∈ {0, 1}L are sampled uniformly and independently (and indepen-
dently of all Σ’s, j, and P ).
Claim 3.7. For every  > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that the distributions µr,n,` and µˆr,n,` are
(, δ
√
n, δ
√
n)-indistinguishable.
Proof of Claim 3.7. We show that any protocol Π with CC(Π) ≤ C distinguishing µ = µr,n,` and
µˆ = µˆr,n,` with advantage  can be converted into a protocol Π
′ with CC(Π′) ≤ C and which
distinguishes DisjYn,
√
n and Disj
N
n,
√
n (as in Corollary 3.5) with advantage .
The protocol Π′ proceeds as follows: suppose Alice and Bob are given sets U, V , respectively,
with U, V ⊆ [n]. Let m = (b√nc+ 1)2. Using public randomness, Alice and Bob sample a random
injective function τ : [n] → [m], and set U ′ = {τ(u) : u ∈ U}, V ′ = {τ(v) : v ∈ V }. Let J0 ∈ [m]
denote the sole index not in the image of τ . Using public randomness, Alice and Bob sample r
permutations Σ1, . . . ,Σr ∈ Sm uniformly and independently, and let I0 = (Σr◦· · ·◦pi1)−1(J0). They
also sample 3m strings A1, . . . , Am, B1, . . . , Bm, C1, . . . , Cm ∈ {0, 1}` uniformly and independently
using public randomness. Then for 1 ≤ u ≤ m, Alice sets:
A′u :=
{
Au : u 6∈ U ′
Cu : u ∈ U ′,
and Bob sets:
B′u :=
{
Bu : u 6∈ U ′
Cu : u ∈ U ′.
It is now clear that the tuple
((Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σr, A
′
1, A
′
2, . . . , A
′
m), (I0,Σ2,Σ4, . . . ,Σr−1, B
′
1, B
′
2, . . . , B
′
m)) (3)
is distributed according to µr,m,` if (U, V ) ∼ DisjNn,√n and is distributed according to µˆr,m,` if
(U, V ) ∼ DisjYn,√n. Now Alice and Bob run the protocol Π with their inputs as in (3).
By Corollary 3.5, for each  > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that µr,m,` and µˆr,m,` are (, δ
√
n, δ
√
n)-
indistinguishable. Using that
√
m−√n = O(1), the lemma statement follows.
Next, notice that the two distributions (µr,n,`)X⊗(µr,n,`)Y and (µˆr,n,`)X⊗(µˆr,n,`)Y are identical.
Thus by Claim 3.7 and the triangle inequality for total variation distance, Theorem 3.3 will follow
from the following claim:
Claim 3.8. For every  > 0 and r ∈ N there exists β, n0 such that for every n ≥ n0 and `, the
distributions µˆ = µˆr,n,` and µˆX ⊗ µˆY are (2, r + 1,
√
n/ logβ n)-indistinguishable.
We next introduce a distribution µmid = µmidr,n,`, which is the same as µˆr,n,`, except the distribu-
tion of the uniformly random subset P ⊂ [n] with |P | = b√nc is not conditioned on the event that
it contains Ir (i.e. it is drawn uniformly at random from the set of all
√
n-element sets, independent
of I0,Σ1, . . . ,Σr). Thus, with probability at least 1 − 1/
√
n, Ir 6∈ P under µmid. Now Claim 3.8
follows directly from the triangle inequality and Claims 3.9 and 3.10 below.
Claim 3.9. For every  > 0 and r ∈ N there exists β, n0 ∈ R+ such that for all integers n ≥ n0
and `, the distributions µˆr,n,` and µ
mid
r,n,` are (, r + 1,
√
n/ logβ n)-indistinguishable.
14
Claim 3.10. For every  > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that µmidr,n,` and (µˆr,n,`)X ⊗ (µˆr,n,`)Y are
(, δ
√
n, δ
√
n)-indistinguishable for all n ∈ N.
Now we prove each of Claims 3.9 and 3.10 in turn.
Proof of Claim 3.9. We first prove the statement of the claim for the case that n is a perfect square.
Fix r, n, `, and suppose that Π is a ρ-round protocol (ρ ∈ N) with communication at most C that
distinguishes between µˆr,n2,` from µ
mid
r,n2,` with advantage . (Notice that we are replacing n with
n2 in the notation.)
We now construct a protocol Π′ with the same number of rounds and communication as Π and
which distinguishes between DYPV(2r− 1, n) and DNPV(2r− 1, n) with advantage at least . Suppose
Alice and Bob are given inputs X = (Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σ2r−1) and Y = (I0, J0,Σ2,Σ4, . . . ,Σ2r−2), respec-
tively, which are distributed according to DYPV(2r−1, n) or DNPV(2r−1, n). Next, for 1 ≤ t ≤ r−1,
let Σ′t = Σt, and for r + 2 ≤ t ≤ 2r, let Σ′t = Σt−1. Finally let Σ′r,Σ′r+1 ∈ Sn be uniformly random
conditioned on Σ′r+1◦Σ′r = Σr. Notice that each Σ′t, 1 ≤ t ≤ 2r may be computed by either Alice or
Bob. Next, interpret [n2] ' [n]× [n], so that any pair σ, τ ∈ Sn of permutations on [n] determines
a permutation on [n2], which we denote by σ||τ , so that (σ||τ)((i, j)) = (σ(i), τ(j)). (Note that the
vast majority of permutations on [n2] cannot be obtained in this manner, however.) The protocol
Π′ proceeds as follows:
1. Alice and Bob use their common randomness to generate uniformly random permutations
τ0, τ1, . . . , τr ∈ Sn2 and uniformly random strings A1, . . . , An2−n, B1, . . . , Bn2−n, C1, . . . , Cn ∈
{0, 1}`.
2. Bob computes Iˆ0 := τ1((I0, J0)) ∈ [n]× [n] ' [n2].
3. For t = 1, 3, . . . , 2b(r + 1)/2c, Alice computes Σˆt := τt ◦ (Σ′t||(Σ′2r+1−t)−1) ◦ τ−1t−1 ∈ Sn2 .
4. For t = 2, 4, . . . , 2br/2c, Bob computes Σˆt := τt ◦ (Σ′t||(Σ′2r+1−t)−1) ◦ τ−1t−1 ∈ Sn2 .
5. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Alice and Bob set Aˆτr((i,i)) = Bˆτr((i,i)) = Ci.
6. For the n2−n pairs (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n] with i 6= j, Alice sets Aˆ(i,j) to be equal to one of the Ak,
1 ≤ k ≤ n2 − n so that each Ak is used once. Bob does the same with Bˆ(i,j) with respect to
the Bk.
7. Alice and Bob now run the protocol Π on the inputs Xˆ := (Σˆ1, Σˆ3, . . . , Σˆ2b(r+1)/2c, Aˆ1, . . . , Aˆn2)
and Yˆ := (Iˆ0, Σˆ2, Σˆ4, . . . , Σˆ2br/2c, Bˆ1, . . . , Bˆn2).
Certainly the communication cost and number of rounds of Π′ are both the same as the communi-
cation cost and number of rounds, respectively, of Π.
We will show that (1) if (X,Y ) ∼ DYPV(2r − 1, n), then (Xˆ, Yˆ ) ∼ µˆr,n2,`, and (2) if (X,Y ) ∼
DNPV(2r − 1, n), then (Xˆ, Yˆ ) ∼ µmidr,n2,`.
We first prove (1). Suppose (X,Y ) ∼ DYPV(2r − 1, n). That is, X,Y are uniformly random
conditioned on Σ2r−1 ◦ · · · ◦ Σ1(I0) = J0; therefore,
Σ′1,Σ
′
2, . . . ,Σ
′
2r, I0, J0
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are uniformly random conditioned on Σ′2r ◦ · · · ◦ Σ′1(I0) = J0. For 0 ≤ t ≤ 2r, set I ′t = Σ′t ◦ Σ′t−1 ◦
· · · ◦ Σ′1(I0) (so that, in particular, I ′0 = I0). Then the distribution of Σ′1, . . . ,Σ′2r, I0, J0 may be
expressed equivalently as follows: X,Y are chosen as follows: Σ′1, . . . ,Σ′2r are first drawn uniformly
and independently form Sn, an index I
′
r ∈ [n] is chosen uniformly in [n] independent of Σ′1, . . . ,Σ′2r,
and then we set J0 = Σ
′
2r ◦ · · · ◦ Σ′r+1(I ′r) and I0 = (Σ′1)−1 ◦ · · · ◦ (Σ′r)−1(I ′r).
Notice that the set P := {τr((i, i)) : i ∈ [n]} is a uniformly random set of size n in [n2] ' [n]×[n].
Next, note that if pi is any distribution on Sn2 and τ is distributed uniformly on Sn2 , then pi ◦ τ
is distributed uniformly on Sn2 . It follows from this fact Σˆ1, . . . , Σˆr are distributed uniformly and
independently in Sn2 , all independent of the set P = {τr((i, i)) : i ∈ [n]}. Next, we have that
Σˆr ◦ · · · ◦ Σˆ1(Iˆ0) = τr ◦ (Σ′r||(Σ′r+1)−1) ◦ τ−1r−1 ◦ τr−1 ◦ · · · ◦ τ−11 ◦ τ1 ◦ (Σ′1||(Σ′2r)−1) ◦ τ−10 ◦ τ0((I0, J0))
= τr ◦ (Σ′r||(Σ′r+1)−1) ◦ · · · ◦ ((Σ′1)||(Σ′2r)−1)((I0, J0))
= τr((Σ
′
r ◦ · · · ◦ Σ′1(I0), (Σ′r+1)−1 ◦ · · · ◦ (Σ′2r)−1(J0)))
= τr((I
′
r, I
′
r)),
where we have used the fact that (X,Y ) ∼ DYPV(2r − 1, n) in the last line. Recall from the
discussion above that I ′r is independent of Σ′1, . . . ,Σ′2r, τ0, . . . , τr, and therefore τr((I ′r, I ′r)) is a
uniformly random element of the set P = {τr((i, i)) : i ∈ [n]}, independent of Σˆ1, . . . , Σˆr, P .
Therefore, Iˆ0 is a uniformly random element of [2n], independent of P, Σˆ1, . . . , Σˆr, conditioned on
the event Σˆr ◦ · · · ◦ Σˆ1(Iˆ0) ∈ P . This establishes that (Xˆ, Yˆ ) ∼ µˆr,n2,`, finishing the proof of point
(1).
We next prove (2); suppose that (X,Y ) ∼ DNPV(2r − 1, n). Then all of the random variables
Σ′1, . . . ,Σ′2r ∈ Sn2 , and I0, J0 ∈ [n] are uniform and independent on their respective domains.
Moreover, the set P := {τr((i, i)) : i ∈ [n]} is a uniformly random set of size n in [n2] ' [n] × [n].
Thus Σˆ1, . . . , Σˆr ∈ Sn2 are uniform and independent in Sn2 , independent of P , and Iˆ0 ∈ [n2] is
uniform, independent of P, Σˆ1, . . . , Σˆr. This establishes that in this case (Xˆ, Yˆ ) ∼ µmidr,n2,`.
Thus the distribution of the transcript of Π′ (excluding the additional public randomness used
by Π′ in the simulation above) when run on DYPV (respectively, D
N
PV) is the same as the distribution
of the transcript of Π when run on µˆr,n2,` (respectively, µ
mid
r,n2,`). It then follows from Theorem 3.6
and the fact that ((2r − 1) + 3)/2 = r + 1 that for every  > 0, there exists β, n0 ∈ R+ such that
for all ` ∈ N and perfect squares n ≥ n0, the distributions µˆr,n,` and µmidr,n,` are (, r+ 1,
√
n/ logβ n)-
indistinguishable.
The case that n is not a perfect square follows immediately: in particular, given a sample
(X,Y ) from either µˆr,n,` or µ
mid
r,n,`, let m denote the smallest perfect square greater than n. Notice
that by viewing [n] as a subset of [m] and using public randomness Alice and Bob can create a
sample (X ′, Y ′) that is sampled from µˆr,m,` if (X,Y ) ∼ µˆr,n,` and that is sampled from µmidr,m,` if
(X,Y ) ∼ µmidr,n,` with no communication.
Next, Claim 3.10 follows as a simple corollary of Corollary 3.5.
Proof of Claim 3.10. The proof is similar to that of Claim 3.7. We reduce the task of distinguishing
µmidr,n,` and (µˆr,n,`)X ⊗ (µˆr,n,`)Y to the task of distinguishing DisjYn,√n and DisjNn,√n (See Corollary
3.5).
In particular, suppose Alice and Bob are given U, V ⊆ [n]. Alice and Bob share common random
uniform strings Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ {0, 1}`. Given U ⊂ [n], Alice sets Au = Zu for u ∈ U and samples
Au ∈ {0, 1}` uniformly and independently for all u ∈ [n]\U . Similarly, for V ⊂ [n], Bob sets
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Bv = Zv for v ∈ V , and samples Bv ∈ {0, 1}` uniformly and independently for all v ∈ [n]\V . Alice
also samples Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σr ∈ Sn uniformly and independently and Bob samples Σ2,Σ4, . . . ,Σr−1 ∈
Sn, I, J ∈ [n] uniformly and independently. Letting X = (Σ1,Σ3, . . . ,Σr, A1, . . . , An) and Y =
(I, J,Σ2,Σ4, . . . ,Σr−1, B1, . . . , Bn), it is easy to see that (X,Y ) ∼ µmidr,n,` if (U, V ) ∼ DisjYn,√n and
that (X,Y ) ∼ (µˆr,n,`)X⊗(µˆr,n,`)Y if (U, V ) ∼ DisjNn,√n. It follows from Corollary 3.5 that for any  >
0 there exists δ > 0 such that µmidr,n,` and (µˆr,n,`)X ⊗ (µˆr,n,`)Y are (, δ
√
n, δ
√
n)-indistinguishble.
We have now verified Claims 3.9, 3.10, which establishes Claim 3.8, which completes the proof
of Theorem 3.3, and thus of Theorem 2.2.
4 Proof of Theorem 2.3; amortized setting
In this section we work towards the proof of Theorem 2.3; recall that part (1) is immediate, so the
main work is in proving parts (2) and (3). As discussed in Section 2.6, there are 3 main steps in
the proof, which proceeds by initially assuming that the tuple (C,L) is r-achievable for appropriate
values of C,L and eventually deriving a contradiction. The first step is to establish a single-letter
characterization4 of the achievable rate region Tr(X,Y ) for amortized CRG, which we explain in
Section 4.1. This single-letter characterization will show that if the tuple (C,L) is r-achievable
for CRG from any source µ, then there is an r-round protocol with internal information cost at
most C and external information cost at least L. In Section 4.2, we show how to convert this
protocol into a nearly equivalent protocol whose communication cost is at most C (recall that in
general, CC(Π) ≥ ICintµ (Π), so upper bounding communication cost is more difficult). Finally, in
Section 4.3 we show how to use the fact that the external information cost is at least L to obtain a
protocol that can distinguish between the pointer-chasing distribution µr,n,` and the product of the
marginals (µr,n,`)X ⊗ (µr,n,`)Y . At this point we will obtain a contradiction for appropriate values
of C,L by Theorems 3.3 and 4.11, which were the key ingredients in the proof for the corresponding
lower bounds in the non-amortized setting (i.e., item (2) of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2).
4.1 Single-letter characterization of Tr(X, Y )
It follows immediately from Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 that the r-round rate region for amortized CRG
and SKG is completely characterized by, for each communication rate C, the maximum real number
L, known as the capacity, such that (C,L) is r-achievable for CRG or SKG:
Definition 4.1 (CR & SK capacity). Suppose a source (X,Y ) ∼ µ is fixed. Then for r ∈ N, C ∈
R+, define the CR capacity with communication C to be
C am-crr (C) := sup
(C,L)∈Tr(X,Y )
L,
and the SK capacity with communication C to be
C am-skr (C) := sup
(C,L)∈Sr(X,Y )
L.
4The term “single-letter characterization” is used relatively loosely in the literature. Following [CK81], for any
k ∈ N and a closed subset S ⊂ Rk, we call a characterization of S a single-letter characterization if it implies, for
any η > 0, the existence of an algorithm that decides whether a point x ∈ Rk is of Euclidean distance at most η to
S. Moreover, this algorithm must run in time at most TS(η), for some function TS : R+ → N. This is related, for
instance, to ideas on the computability of subsets of Rk considered in [Bra05].
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The single-letter characterization of Tr(X,Y ) relies on the concepts of internal information
cost and external information cost of a protocol Π [BBCR13, BR11, BRWY13, BGPW13, Bra12].
The external information cost of a (multiple-round) protocol Π describes how much information Π
reveals about the inputs X,Y to an external observer who only sees the transcript of the protocol,
while the internal information cost describes how much information Alice and Bob reveal to each
other about their own inputs:
Definition 4.2 (External and internal information costs). Given any communication protocol Π
with a maximum of r rounds, public randomness RPub, and a distribution (X,Y ) ∼ µ of inputs,
the external information cost ICextµ (Π) is given by:
ICextµ (Π) := I(Π
r, RPub;X,Y ).
If Π does not use public randomness, then ICextµ (Π) := I(Π
r;X,Y ).
The internal information cost ICintµ (Π) is given by
ICintµ (Π) := I(Π
r, RPub;X|Y ) + I(Πr, RPub;Y |X).
If Π does not use public randomness, then ICintµ (Π) := I(Π
r;X|Y ) + I(Πr;Y |X).
Remark 4.3. It is well-known that for any distribution µ, and any protocol Π, ICintµ (Π) ≤
ICextµ (Π) ≤ CC(Π).
An original motivation behind the introduction of internal and external information costs was to
understand the possibility of proving direct sum results for communication complexity [CSWY01,
JRS03, HJMR07, BBCR13]. In light of the connection with direct sum results, the fact that
internal and external information costs appear in characterizations for amortized CRG and SKG is
not surprising. In particular, the amortized CRG and SKG problems can be viewed as the task of
solving N independent instances of CRG or SKG from a source µ, with an additional requirement
that each of Alice’s N output strings must agree with each of Bob’s N output strings simultaneously
with high probability.
An additional ingredient in the single-letter chararcterization of Tr(X,Y ) is the minimum r-
round interaction for maximum key rate (i.e., the r-round MIMK). Ahlswede and Csisza´r showed
in their seminal work [AC93] that the maximum key rate L that Alice and Bob can generate from
a source (X,Y ) ∼ µ, without restricting communication, is Iµ(X;Y ). In other words, we have:
supC≥0 C am-skr (C) = I(X;Y ). The r-round MIMK describes the minimum amount of communica-
tion needed to obtain this key rate of I(X;Y ):
Definition 4.4. If (X,Y ) ∼ µ is a source and r ≥ 1, Then the r-round MIMK is defined as
Ir(X;Y ) = inf
C≥0:C am-skr (C)=I(X;Y )
{C}.
Tyagi [Tya13] proved the following single-letter characterization of the r-round MIMKIr(X;Y ):
Theorem 4.1 ([Tya13], Theorem 4). For a source (X,Y ) ∼ µ, the r-round MIMK is the infimum
of all C ≥ 0 such that there exists an r-round private-coin protocol Π such that ICintµ (Π) ≤ C and
ICextµ (Π) ≥ C + I(X;Y ).
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Using Theorem 4.1, we finally can state the single-letter characterization of achievable rates for
r-round CRG. It is stated most precisely in [STW19], but similar results are shown in [LCV17,
GJ18, Liu16, Ye05, GA10a, GA10b].
Theorem 4.2 ([STW19], Theorem III.2). For C ≥ 0, define
C˜ am-crr (C) :=
{
supΠ=(Π1,...,Πr):ICintµ (Π)≤C{IC
ext
µ (Π)} : C ≤ Ir(X;Y )
I(X;Y ) + C : C > Ir(X;Y ),
(4)
where the supremum is ocver all r-round private-coin protocols Π with ICintµ (Π) ≤ C.
Then for a source (X,Y ) ∼ µ, the r-round CR capacity is given by
C am-crr (C) = C˜
am-cr
r (C). (5)
Remark 4.5. We briefly explain how Theorem 4.2 does in fact provide a single-letter characteri-
zation for Tr(X,Y ) = {(C,L) : C ≥ 0, L ≤ C am-crr (C)}. It follows from the support lemma [CK81,
Lemma 15.4] that the protocols Π = (Π1, . . . ,Πr) in the definition of C˜ am-crr (C) can be restricted to
the class of protocols where Πt, 1 ≤ t ≤ r, falls in a finite set of size Ut at most |X ||Y|
∏t−1
t′=1 |Ut′ |+1.
Then by iterating through all possible distributions of Πt|Πt−1X, for t odd, and Πt|Πt−1Y , for t
even, at a sufficiently small granularity, we can approximate C˜ am-crr (C) to any given precision.
For the purpose of proving Theorem 2.3, we will only need the inequality C am-crr (C) ≤ C˜ am-crr (C)
(which is often called the converse direction of the equality in Theorem 4.2). As a full proof of
Theorem 4.2 (and in particular, of this inequality) does not appear to have been collected in the
literature, we provide one in Section 5. The following is an immediate consequence of this inequality:
Corollary 4.3. For each tuple (C,L) ∈ Tr(X,Y ) with L < I(X;Y ), there is some protocol Π =
(Π1, . . . ,Πr) such that IC
int
µ (Π) ≤ C and ICextµ (Π) ≥ L.
Proof. First suppose that C ≤ Ir(X;Y ). Then the existence of the r-round protocol Π follows
from (5).
Next suppose C > Ir(X;Y ). Notice that (Ir(X;Y ), I(X;Y )) ∈ Tr(X,Y ), since C am-crr (Ir(X;Y )) =
I(X;Y ) +Ir(X;Y ). Therefore, the case C ≤ Ir(X;Y ) gives that there is an r-round protocol Π
such that ICintµ (Π) ≤ Ir(X;Y ) < C and ICextµ (Π) ≥ I(X;Y ) > L, as desired.
4.2 Using the compression of internal information to communication
A crucial technical ingredient in doing so is the use of an “compression of internal information
cost to communication” result for bounded round protocols, saying that for any protocol with a
fixed number r of rounds and internal information cost I, there is another protocol with the same
number r of rounds and communication cost not much larger than I. As we discussed in Section 2,
these types of theorems were originally proved in order to establish direct sum and direct product
results for communication complexity. Our use of these compression results may be interpreted as
a roughly analogous approach for the setting of amortized CRG and SKG, which can be thought
of as the “direct sum version of non-amortized CRG and SKG”.
Theorem 4.4 (Lemma 3.4, [JPY12]). Suppose that (X,Y ) ∼ ν are inputs to an r-round com-
munication protocol Π with public randomness RPub (and which may use private coins as well.
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Then for every  > 0, there is a public coin protocol L with r rounds and communication at most
ICintµ (Π)+5r
 +O(r log(1/)) such that at the end of the protocol each party possesses a random variable
(Πˆ1, . . . , Πˆr) representing a transcript for Π, which satisfies
∆((RPub, X, Y,Π1, . . . ,Πr), (RPub, X, Y, Πˆ1, . . . , Πˆr)) ≤ 6r.
Our first lemma, Lemma 4.5, uses Theorem 4.4 to show that for any protocol Π which satisfies
ICextµ (Π)  ICintµ (Π) then there exists another protocol Π with communication cost not much
greater than ICintµ (Π) and which satisfies some additional properties:
Lemma 4.5. Fix any r, n, ` ∈ N, and let µ = µr,n,`. Suppose ρ ∈ N and C,L ∈ R+. Suppose Π is
a ρ-round protocol with ICextµ (Π) = L and IC
int
µ (Π) = C and public randomness RPub (and which
may use private randomness as well). Then for every  > 0 there is some ρ-round protocol Π′ with
inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µ, public randomness RPub, with communication at most C+5ρ + O(ρ log 1/) and
which outputs keys K ′A,K ′B, such that
1. Pµ[K ′A = K ′B] = 1.
2. When inputs (X,Y ) are drawn from µ, I(K ′A;BIr) = I(K ′A;AIr) ≥ L−(C+1+2 log n+36ρ`).
3. When inputs (X,Y ) are drawn from µX ⊗ µY ,
IµX⊗µY (K
′
A, RPub, (Π
′)ρ;B1, . . . , Bn) ≤ C + 5ρ

+O(ρ log 1/) (6)
and
IµX⊗µY (K
′
B, RPub, (Π
′)ρ;A1, . . . , An) ≤ C + 5ρ

+O(ρ log 1/). (7)
Proof. Let Π′ be the protocol given by Theorem 4.4 for the protocol Π and the given . Then the
communication of Π′ is at most C+5ρ +O(ρ log 1/)). At the end of Π
′, Alice and Bob each possess
a random variable (Πˆ1, . . . , Πˆρ), such that, when (X,Y ) ∼ µ,
∆((RPub, X, Y, Πˆ1, . . . , Πˆρ), (RPub, X, Y,Π1, . . . ,Πρ)) ≤ 6ρ. (8)
(Notice that Πˆρ = (Πˆ1, . . . , Πˆρ) is different from the transcript (Π
′)ρ = (Π′1, . . . ,Π′ρ) of Π′.) Now
set K ′A = K ′B = (Πˆ1, . . . , Πˆρ), which immediately establishes item (1) of the lemma.
To establish point (2), we will first argue that it holds for Π; in particular we show that when
(X,Y ) ∼ µ,
H(BIr |Πρ) ≤ `+ C − L+ 2 log n. (9)
(Since H(Bir) = ` it will follow from (9) that Iµ(Π
ρ;BIr) ≥ L−C− 2 log n, though we will not use
this directly.) To see this, first notice that5
I(X;Y |Πρ) = I(Y ;X,Πρ)− I(Πρ;Y )
= I(X;Y ) + I(Πρ;Y |X) + I(Πρ;X|Y )− I(Πρ;X,Y )
= I(X;Y ) + ICintµ (Π)− ICextµ (Π) (10)
≤ `+ C − L.
5We remark that the equality of I(X;Y |Πρ) to (10) also played a crucial role in [LCV17] which derived a charac-
terization of the achievable rate region in terms of the convex envelope of a functional on source distributions.
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Recalling the notation Ir = Σr ◦ · · · ◦Σ1(I0), we observe by Lemma 6.2 and the data processing
inequality that
I(X;Y |Πρ) ≥ I(X;Y |Πρ, Ir)− log n
≥ I(AIr ;BIr |Πρ, Ir)− log n
≥ I(AIr ;BIr |Πρ)− 2 log n
= H(AIr |Πρ)− 2 log n = H(BIr |Πρ)− 2 log n,
since H(AIr |BIr ,Πρ) = H(AIr |BIr) = 0 as AIr = BIr for all inputs in the support of µ. It then
follows that H(BIr |Πρ, RPub) ≤ `+ C − L+ 2 log n, establishing (9).
Next, (8) and the data processing inequality give us that ∆((RPub, BIr ,Π
ρ), (RPub, BIr , Πˆ
ρ)) ≤
6ρ. Corollary 6.5 and (9) then give that
H(BIr |Πˆρ, RPub) ≤ H(BIr |Πˆρ) ≤ `+ C − L+ 2 log n+ 36ρ`+ 1.
Since K ′A = Πˆρ, we get that
I(BIr ;K
′
A) ≥ L− (C + 1 + 2 log n+ 36ρ`),
which establishes point (2).
Finally, to establish point (3), first notice that some inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µX⊗µY may not be in the
support of µ. We may extend the protocol Π′ to be defined for all pairs of inputs (X,Y ) ∈ X×Y, by
choosing an arbitrary behavior (e.g., terminating immediately) whenever there is a partial transcript
(Π′)t−1 for which the distribution of the next message Π′t has not been defined.
Recall that (Π′1, . . . ,Π′ρ) denotes the transcript of communication of Π′ and RPub is the public
randomness of Π′, so that when (X,Y ) ∼ µX ⊗ µY ,
IµX⊗µY ((Π
′)ρ, X,RPub;Y ) = IµX⊗µY ((Π
′)ρ;Y |X,RPub) ≤ HµX⊗µY ((Π′)ρ) ≤
C + 5ρ

+O(ρ log 1/).
Recalling that K ′A = Πˆρ, by construction of Π′ (and Πˆ) from Theorem 4.4, it follows that
(K ′A, RPub, (Π
′)ρ)− (X, (Π′)ρ, RPub)− Y
is a Markov chain. It then follows from the data processing inequality that
IµX⊗µY (K
′
A, RPub, (Π
′)ρ;B1, . . . , Bn) ≤ IµX⊗µY (KˆA′, RPub, (Π′)ρ;Y ) ≤
C + 5ρ

+O(ρ log 1/),
which gives (6); (7) follows in a similar manner.
Roughly speaking, the next lemma, Lemma 4.6, shows how the protocol Π′ constructed in
Lemma 4.5 can use the properties (2) and (3) of Lemma 4.5 to distinguish between the distributions
µ (ν1 in the below statement) and µX ⊗µY (ν2 in the below statement). This, in combination with
the result from Theorem 3.3 stating that µ and µX ⊗ µY are indistinguishable to protocols with
little communication, will ultimately complete the proof of Theorem 2.3.
Lemma 4.6. Suppose ν1, ν2 are distributions over tuples of random variables (Z1, . . . , Zn, I,K, K˜),
where Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ {0, 1}`, I ∈ [n], and K ∈ K, where K is a finite set. Suppose that the marginal
distribution of Z1, . . . , Zn, I over each of ν1, ν2 is uniform over {0, 1}n` × [n]. Finally suppose that
0 < ξ < 1 and C satisfy log n ≤ C ≤ (1−ξ)3`1620 as well as:
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1. Iν1(K;Z1, . . . , Zn) ≤ C.
2. Iν2(K;ZI) ≥ `(1− ξ).
3. Pν2 [K = K˜] = 1, and Pν1 [K = K˜] ≥ 1− (1− ξ)2/36.
Then there is some function f : K × {0, 1}n` → {0, 1} such that∣∣∣Eν1 [f(K˜, Z1, . . . , Zn)]− Eν2 [f(K˜, Z1, . . . , Zn)]∣∣∣ ≥ p/2,
where p = (1− ξ)2/18.
We first establish some basic lemmas before proving Lemma 4.6.
Lemma 4.7. Suppose W ∈ {0, 1}` is a random variable, and H(W ) = c. For any δ ∈ (0, 1] there
is some set S ⊂ {0, 1}` such that |S| ≤ 2c/δ and P[W 6∈ S] ≤ δ.
Proof. Set
S = {w ∈ {0, 1}` : P[W = w] ≥ 2−c/δ}.
We know that c = H(W ) = Ew∼W [log(1/P[W = w])], so the probability that P[W = w] < 2−c/δ,
i.e. that log(1/P[W = w]) > c/δ, over w ∼ W is at most δ. Thus P[W 6∈ S] ≤ δ. Clearly, by the
definition of S, we have that |S| ≤ 2c/δ.
Lemma 4.8. Suppose that random variables I, Z1, . . . , Zn are distributed jointly so that the marginal
of Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ {0, 1}` is uniform on {0, 1}n`. Then H(ZI) ≥ `− log n.
Proof. Notice that
H(ZI , ZI+1, . . . , ZI+n−1) ≥ H(ZI , . . . , ZI+n−1|I)
= Ei∼I [H(Zi, . . . , Zi+n−1|I = i)]
= Ei∼I [H(Z1, . . . , Zn|I = i)]
= H(Z1, . . . , Zn|I)
≥ `n− log n, (11)
where addition of subscripts is taken modulo n. Since (ZI+1, . . . , ZI+n−1) ∈ {0, 1}`n−`, we get that
H(ZI) ≥ H(ZI |ZI+1, . . . , ZI+n−1) ≥ H(ZI , . . . , ZI+n−1)− (`n− `) ≥ `− log n,
as desired.
Lemma 4.9. Suppose that W ∈ {0, 1}` is a random variable with H(W ) = h ≤ `. Let S ⊂ {0, 1}`
be a subset with size |S| ≤ 2c, for some c < `. Then P[W ∈ S] ≤ `+1−h`−c .
Proof. Write p = P[W ∈ S]. Let J = 1[W ∈ S]. Then pc + (1 − p)` ≥ pc + (1 − p) log(2` − 2c) ≥
H(W |J) ≥ H(W )− 1 = h− 1. Hence p(c− `) ≥ h− 1− `, so p ≤ `+1−h`−c .
Now we prove Lemma 4.6.
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Proof of Lemma 4.6. We will first define f and determine a lower bound on Eν2 [f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn)].
By assumption, Hν2(ZI) = `, so Hν2(ZI |K) ≤ ξ`. For each k ∈ K, let γk = H(ZI |K = k)/`,
so that Ek∼K [γk] ≤ ξ. Pick some η > 1, ζ > 1 to be specified later. By Lemma 4.7, for each
k ∈ K, there is a set Tk ⊂ {0, 1}` of size at most 2ηγk` such that Pν2 [ZI 6∈ Tk|K = k] ≤ 1/η.
Next, set S = {k ∈ K : γk ≤ ζξ}. By Markov’s inequality, Pν2 [K ∈ S] ≥ 1 − 1/ζ. Thus
Pν2 [K ∈ S] · Pν2 [ZI ∈ TK |K ∈ S] ≥ (1− 1/ζ) · (1− 1/η), and for all k ∈ S, |Tk| ≤ 2ηζξ` < 2ηζ`.
We now set
f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn) =
{∨
i∈[n] 1[Zi ∈ TK ] : K ∈ S
0 : else.
Since P[K ∈ S] · P[ZI ∈ TK |K ∈ S] ≤ E
[∨i∈[n]1[Zi ∈ TK ]],
Eν2 [f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn)] ≥ (1− 1/η) · (1− 1/ζ).
Next we determine an upper bound on Eν1 [f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn)]. Define a random variable Iˆ =
Iˆ(Z1, . . . , Zn,K), by Iˆ = min{i : Zi ∈ TK}, if the set {i : Zi ∈ TK} is nonempty, else Iˆ = 1.
Thus H(Iˆ) ≤ log n. Consider the random variable ZIˆ ∈ {0, 1}`. It follows that f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn) ≤
1[ZIˆ ∈ TK ]. By Lemma 6.2 and the data processing inequality, we have that
Iν1(K;ZIˆ)− log n ≤ Iν1(K;ZIˆ |Iˆ) ≤ Iν1(K;Z1, . . . , Zn|Iˆ) ≤ Iν1(K;Z1, . . . , Zn) + log n ≤ C + log n.
Lemma 4.8 gives that Hν1(ZIˆ) ≥ ` − log n, so Hν1(ZIˆ |K) ≥ ` − C − 3 log n. For each k ∈ K, let
hk = Hν1(ZIˆ |K = k), so that Eν1 [hK ] ≥ ` − C − 3 log n. By Lemma 4.9, for each k ∈ K with
ηγk < 1, P[ZIˆ ∈ TK |K = k] ≤ `+1−hk`(1−ηγk) , by our upper bound |Tk| ≤ 2ηγk`.
Recall that Eν2 [γk] ≤ ξ. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Kνi be the marginal distribution of K according
to νi. We must have that ∆(Kν2 ,Kν1) < p, else we could choose f to be a function of only K
and would get that |Eν1 [f ] − Eν2 [f ]| ≥ p. Thus 1 − 1/ζ − p ≤ Pν1 [K ∈ S] ≤ 1. Next notice that
Eν1 [`−hK ] ≤ C + 3 log n, and that `−hK ≥ 0 with probability 1. Therefore, Eν1 [`−hK |K ∈ S] ≤
C+3 logn
1−1/ζ−p . Since γk ≤ ζξ for all k ∈ S, it follows that
Eν1 [f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn)] ≤ Eν1 [f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn)|K ∈ S]
≤ Pν1 [ZIˆ ∈ TK |K ∈ S]
≤
1 + C+3 logn1−1/ζ−p
`(1− ηζξ) .
Thus
Eν2 [f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn)]− Eν1 [f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn)] ≥ (1− 1/ζ) ·
(
(1− 1/η)− 1
1− 1/ζ ·
1 + C+3 logn1−1/ζ−p
`(1− ηζξ)
)
.
Now, choose η = ζ = ξ−1/3, and let ξ′ = 1 − ξ, so that p ≤ ξ′/6 ≤ 1−(1−ξ′)1/32 = 1−1/ζ2 . Using the
inequality ax ≤ 1− (1− x)a ≤ x for 0 < a < 1, x ∈ [0, 1] and C ≥ log n gives
Eν2 [f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn)]− Eν1 [f(K,Z1, . . . , Zn)] ≥ ξ′/3 ·
(
ξ′/3− 1
(1− 1/ζ)(1− 1/ζ − p) ·
15C
ξ′`
)
≥ ξ′/3 ·
(
ξ′/3− 270C
(ξ′)2`
)
≥ (ξ′)2/18 = p,
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where the last inequality follows from C ≤ (ξ′)3`1620 .
Since K = K˜ over ν2 and are only nonequal with probability at most p/2 over ν1, it follows
that
Eν2 [f(K˜, Z1, . . . , Zn)]− Eν1 [f(K˜, Z1, . . . , Zn)] ≥ p/2,
as desired.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Using Lemmas 4.5, 4.6, and Theorem 4.2, we now may prove Theorem 2.3:
Proof of Theorem 2.3. The first part of Theorem 2.3 follows in the same way as the amortized
case: given N i.i.d. samples of (X,Y ) ∼ µr,n,`, by following the pointers for each sample, Alice
and Bob can use r + 2 rounds of communication (simultaneously over all samples), communicate
a total of (r + 2)dlog ne bits, and generate N i.i.d. strings uniformly distributed on {0, 1}`. Their
resulting keys (of length N`) will agree with probability 1 and be independent of the transcript of
communication.
To prove the second part of Theorem 2.3, first suppose r is odd. We take µ = µr,n,` and set
 = γ/(54(r + 1)).
We argue by contradiction. Suppose the theorem statement is false: namely, that for some
C ≤ n/ logc0 n and L > γ`, the tuple (C,L) is b(r + 1)/2c-achievable from µ. We can assume
without loss of generality that L < `. By Theorem 4.2 (and in particular, Corollary 4.3), since
Iµ(X;Y ) = ` > L, there is a b(r+1)/2c-round protocol Π such that ICintµ (Π) ≤ C and ICextµ (Π) ≥ L.
By Lemma 4.5, there is an b(r+1)/2c-round public-coin protocol Π′ with inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µ and
communication at most C+3+5r/2 +O(r log 1/) such that at the end of Π
′ with inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µ,
Alice and Bob output keys K ′A = K ′B, respectively, which satisfy Iµ(K ′B;BIr) ≥ L−(C+1+2 log n+
18(r + 1)`). Moreover, when (X,Y ) ∼ µX ⊗ µY ,
max{IµX⊗µY (K ′A;B1, . . . , Bn), IµX⊗µY (K ′B;A1, . . . , An)} ≤
C + 3 + 5r/2

+O(r log 1/).
Next, let Π′′ be the protocol where the parties run Π′, and the last party (suppose it is Alice, for
concreteness) to speak in Π′ sends over a random hash h(K ′A) of length O(log 1/γ), so that for any
K ′A 6= K ′B, Ph[h(K ′A) = h(K ′B)] ≤ γ2/648, and the other party, Bob, outputs a final bit equal to
1[h(K ′A) = h(K ′B)]. For sufficiently large n, we have that
CC(Π′′) ≤ C + 3 + 5r/2

+O(r log 1/) +O(log 1/γ) ≤ n/ log(c0−1) n. (12)
Claim 4.10. Π′′ distinguishes µ and µX ⊗ µY with advantage at least γ2/324.
Proof. To prove Claim 4.10, we consider two cases.
The first case is that PµX⊗µY [K ′A 6= K ′B] ≥ γ2/324. In this case, the last bit output by Bob will
be 0 with probability at least γ2/648 when (X,Y ) ∼ µX ⊗ µY . Since K ′A = K ′B with probability 1
when (X,Y ) ∼ µ, it follows that Π′′ distinguishes between the two distributions with advantage at
least γ2/648 in this case.
The second case is that PµX⊗µY [K ′A 6= K ′B] ≤ γ2/324. Here we will use Lemma 4.6. Since
18(r + 1) ≤ γ/3, and since for sufficiently large n, C + 1 + 2 log n ≤ γn/3 = γ`/3, we see that
Iµ(K
′
B;BIr) ≥ γ`− 2γ`/3 = γ`/3.
24
We apply Lemma 4.6, with (Z1, . . . , Zn) = (B1, . . . , Bn), I = Ir,K = K
′
A, K˜ = K
′
B, ν1 = µX ⊗
µY , ν2 = µ, ξ = 1 − γ/3 and L = n/ log(c0−1) n. Here we use that n/ log(c0−1) n ≤ (γ/3)
3n
1620 for
sufficiently large n (depending on γ), as well as PµX⊗µY [K ′A 6= K ′B] ≤ γ2/324 = (1 − ξ)2/36. Then
Lemma 4.6 gives that Bob can output a bit as a deterministic function of K ′B, B1, . . . , Bn (all of
which Bob holds at the conclusion of Π′), that distinguishes µ and µX⊗µY with advantage at least
γ2/324.
By Theorem 4.11 below (which is analogous to Theorem 3.3), with  = γ2/324, and as long as
c0 is large enough so that the right-hand side of (12) holds for n ≥ c0, and such that c0 − 1 ≥ β
(where β is chosen from Theorem 4.11, given  = γ2/325), we arrive at a contradiction.
Theorem 4.11 ([BGGS18], Lemma 4.5). For every  > 0 and odd r there exists β, n0 such that
for every n ≥ n0 and `, the distributions µ = µr,n,` and µX ⊗ µY are (, (r + 3)/2, n/ logβ n)-
indistinguishable.
For even r, we use the distribution µ = µr−1,n,`. Part (1) of the theorem still holds (in fact, we
even have (r + 1)-achievability). For part (2), the argument above applies, except now the lower
bound on round complexity is d((r − 1) + 1)/2e = dr/2e = r/2.
Finally, to prove part (3) of Theorem 2.3, an argument virtually identical to the one for part
(2) applies, except that the protocols Π and Π′ have r rounds, the protocol Π′′ has r + 1 rounds,
and the upper bound in (12) is
√
n/ log(c0−1) n, which needs to be less than (γ/3)
3n
1620 =
(γ/3)3`
1620 (which
it is, for sufficiently large n). In the last step fo the proof, we use Theorem 3.3 (instead of Theorem
4.11), which establishes that µ and µX ⊗ µY are (, r+ 1,
√
n/poly log n)-indistinguishable for any
constant  > 0.
4.4 Separations in MIMK
In this section we use Theorem 2.3 to derive separations in the MIMK for the pointer chasing
source µr,n,` (recall Definition 4.4). The below Theorem 4.12 generalizes a result of Tyagi [Tya13],
which established a constant-factor separation in the MIMK for 2-round and 1-round protocols for
a certain source.
Theorem 4.12. For each r ∈ N, there is a c0 such that for each n ≥ c0, the pointer chasing source
µr,n,n satisfies:
1. Ir+2(X;Y ) ≤ (r + 2)dlog ne.
2. Ib(r+1)/2c(X;Y ) > n/ logc0 n.
3. Ir(X;Y ) >
√
n/ logc0 n.
Proof. Let the constant c0 be that given by Theorem 2.3 for an arbitrary γ.
The first item follows from the definition ofIr(X;Y ) in Definition 4.4, the fact that Iµr,n,n(X;Y ) =
n (Lemma 3.1), and the first item of Theorem 2.3 stating that the tuple ((r+2)dlog ne, n) is (r+2)-
achievable for SKG from the source µr,n,n.
To see the second item, suppose thatIb(r+1)/2c(X;Y ) ≤ n/ logc0 n. Then the tuple (n/ logc0 n, `)
is b(r + 1)/2c-achievable from the source µr,n,n, contradicting the second item of Theorem 2.3.
Similarly, for the third item, if Ir(X;Y ) ≤
√
n/ logc0 n, then the tuple (
√
n/ logc0 n, `) would
be r-achievable from the source µr,n,n, contradicting the third item of Theorem 2.3.
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Notice that the MIMK deals with very large rates of communication; in particular, communi-
cation at rates larger than the MIMK is no longer interesting, as, for instance, the entropy rate
L for SKG is fixed at I(X;Y ). One can ask, on the other hand, whether Theorem 2.3 allows us
to determine a separation in some measure that determines the efficiency of CRG and SKG at
very small rates of communication. Formally, we consider the common random bits per r-round
interaction bit (r-round CBIB) and the secret key bits per r-round interaction bit (r-round KBIB):
Definition 4.6 ([LCV17], Corollary 26). For a source (X,Y ) ∼ µ and r ∈ N, define:
Γcrr (X,Y ) = sup
{
L
C
: (C,L) ∈ Tr(X,Y ), C > 0
}
and
Γskr (X,Y ) = sup
{
L
C
: (C,L) ∈ Sr(X,Y ), C > 0
}
.
Notice that Γcrr (X,Y ) and Γ
sk
r (X,Y ) can be infinite, if, for instance, there are functions fA : X →
{0, 1} and fB : Y → {0, 1} such that Pµ[fA(X) = fB(Y )] = 1 and L := H(fA(X)) = H(fB(Y )) > 0.
In such a case, (0, L) ∈ Tr(X,Y ). It is easy to see that whenever Γskr (X,Y ) or Γcrr (X,Y ) is finite,
we have Γcrr (X,Y ) = 1 + Γ
sk
r (X,Y ).
Intuitively, the r-round CBIB (KBIB, respectively) can be roughly interpreted as the maximum
number of additional bits of common randomness (secret key, respectively) that Alice and Bob can
obtain by communicating an additional bit, where the maximum is over “all protocols and any
communication rate”.
We also remark that it follows from Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 5.4 that Γcrr (X,Y ) is the derivative
of the function C am-crr (C) at C = 0.
Next we would like to derive similar separations for the r-round interactive CBIB and KBIB to
that in Theorem 4.12 for the r-round MIMK. Notice that from the first item of Theorem 2.3 we
have immediately that Γcrr+2(X,Y ) ≥ n(r+2)dlogne . We might hope to use the second and third items
of Theorem 2.3 to derive upper bounds on Γcrb(r+1)/2c(X,Y ) and Γ
cr
r (X,Y ) that grow as log
c0 n and√
n logc0 n, respectively. However, such upper bounds do not immediately follow from Theorem 2.3
since Theorem 2.3 requires a lower bound on L in order to show that certain tuples (C,L) are not
achievable. In particular, Theorem 2.3 leaves open the possibility that tuples such as (logn,
√
n), or
even (2−n, 1) are b(r+1)/2c-achievable for CRG from µr,n,n. This limitation of Theorem 2.3 results
from the fact that Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6 give vacuous bounds on the disintuishability of µ = µr,n,n
and µX ⊗ µY when the tuple (C,L) is such that L is small compared to n. We leave the problem
of remedying this issue for future work:
Problem 4.7. For each r ∈ N, show (perhaps using Theorem 2.3) that there is a c0, such that for
each n ≥ c0, the pointer chasing source (X,Y ) ∼ µr,n,n satisfies:
1. Γcrb(r+1)/2c(X,Y ) ≤ logc0 n.
2. Γcrr (X,Y ) ≤
√
n logc0 n.
It seems that in fact the even stronger result Γcrr+1(X,Y ) ≤ 1 + on(1) holds.
6Typically the r-round CBIB and KBIB are introduced in a different way by explicitly considering families of
protocols, though this will not be important for our purposes.
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Problem 4.7 seems to be quite difficult; a result that Γcrr′ (X,Y ) < f(n), for (X,Y ) ∼ µr,n,n,
some r′ ∈ N, and some function f(n) would imply, by concavity of the function C 7→ C am-crr (C)
(Lemma 5.4), that for any C ≥ 1, the tuple (C, f(n) · C) is not r′-achievable for CRG from µr,n,n.
For r′ = b(r + 1)/2c and f(n) = poly log(n), this would imply part (2) of Theorem 2.3, and for
r′ = r and f(n) =
√
n poly log(n), this would imply part (3) of Theorem 2.3.
5 Proof of the converse direction of Theorem 4.2
Recall our definition of
C˜ am-crr (C) :=
{
supΠ=(Π1,...,Πr):ICintµ (Π)≤C{IC
ext
µ (Π)} : C ≤ Ir(X;Y )
I(X;Y ) + C : C > Ir(X;Y ),
Our goal in this section is to establish the following:
Theorem 5.1 (Converse direction of Theorem 4.2). C am-crr (C) ≤ C˜ am-crr (C).
Theorem 5.1 essentially states that any (private-coin) protocol Π for CRG can be converted
into a (private-coin) protocol whose internal and external information costs are related to the
communication and common randomness rates of Π in a particular way. We prove Theorem 5.1
by first establishing such a statement for deterministic protocols in Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3
below. We will then use certain properties of C˜ am-crr (C) to “upgrade” this statement to apply to
randomized protocols.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose (X,Y ) ∼ µ for some source µ, and that the tuple (C,L), for C,L ∈ R+ is
achievable by an r-round deterministic protocol (in the sense of Definition 2.1; that is, all properties
of Definition 2.1 hold verbatim, except Π is not allowed to use private random coins). Then for
any L′ < L,C ′ > C, there is some N0 such that for all N ≥ N0, there is an r-round deterministic
protocol Π′ with inputs (XN , Y N ) ∼ µ⊗N such that
(1) ICextµ⊗N (Π
′) ≥ L′N .
(2) ICintµ⊗N (Π
′) ≤ C ′N .
Proof. Choose C ′′ with C ′ > C ′′ > C and L′′ with L′ < L′′ < L. By Definition 2.1, there is
some N0 so that for each N ≥ N0, there is an r-round protocol Π taking inputs from µ⊗N and
producing keys KA,KB in some set KN with |KN | ≥ L′N so that CC(Π) =
∑r
t=1 |Πt| ≤ C ′′N and
∆(KAKB,KK) ≤ N for some
N < min
{
C ′ − C ′′ − 2/N
L′
,
L′′ − L′ − 1/N
L′′
}
.
(Here K ∈ KN denotes the random variable uniformly distributed on KN .) By truncating the keys
we may assume without loss of generality that |KN | ≤ 2dL′Ne. It follows from ∆(KAKB,KK) ≤ N
that P[KA 6= KB] ≤ N . Moreover, using Lemma 6.4, we obtain
min{H(KA), H(KB)} ≥ log |KN | − (h(N ) + N · log |KN |) ≥ (1− N )L′′N − 1 ≥ L′N, (13)
where we have used N ≤ L
′′−L′−1/N
L′′ .
Now let Π′ be the following protocol:
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1. Alice and Bob first simulate Π, i.e., they exchange the messages Π1, . . . ,Πr.
2. Then the last person to speak in Π outputs their key (i.e., if it is Alice, then she outputs KA
and if it is Bob then he outputs KB).
Suppose for simplicity that r is odd, so that Alice is the last person to speak in Π (the case r even
is nearly identical). Then since Π is deterministic, KA,Π
r is a deterministic function of X,Y , so
H(KA,Π
r|X,Y ) = 0. Noting the transcript of Π′ is given by (Π1, . . . ,Πr−1, (Πr,KA)), it follows
that
ICext(Π′) = I(KA,Πr;X,Y ) = H(KA,Πr)−H(KA,Πr|X,Y ) ≥ H(KA,Πr) ≥ H(KA) ≥ L′N,
where the last inequality uses (13).
To upper bound ICint(Π′), notice that
ICintµ⊗N (Π
′) = I(Πr,KA;XN |Y N ) + I(Πr,KA;Y N |XN )
= I(Πr;XN |Y N ) + I(KA;XN |Πr, Y N ) + I(Πr;Y N |XN )
= ICintµ⊗N (Π) + I(KA;X
N |Πr, Y N )
≤ CC(Π) +H(KA|Πr, Y N )
≤ C ′′N + NdL′Ne+ 1
≤ C ′N,
where we have used Fano’s inequality, the fact that P[KA 6= KB] ≤ N , and that KB is a deterministic
function of ΠR, Y N . Moreover, the last inequality uses N <
C′−C′′−2/N
L′ .
The next lemma, which states that the internal and external information complexities tensorize
(i.e., they satisfy a direct sum property), was proved in [GJ18].
Lemma 5.3 ([GJ18], Lemma 14). Suppose that Π is an r-round private-coin protocol with inputs
(XN , Y N ) ∼ ν⊗N . Then there is an r-round private-coin protocol Π′ with only private randomness,
inputs (X,Y ) ∼ ν, such that:
(1) ICintν⊗N (Π) = N · ICintν (Π′).
(2) ICextν⊗N (Π) ≤ N · ICextν (Π′).
Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 are sufficient to prove the converse direction of a version of Theorem 4.2 for
deterministic protocols. To prove the converse direction for randomized protocols (i.e., Theorem
5.1), we first need to establish some properties of C˜ am-crr (C) in Lemma 5.4 below.
Lemma 5.4. For each fixed r ∈ N, C˜ am-crr (·) is a nondecreasing concave function on R≥0. In
particular, it is continuous, and dC˜
am-cr
r (C)
dC ≥ 1 for all C ≥ 0.
Proof. First we suppose C ′ < C ≤ Ir(X;Y ). That C˜ am-crr (C) is non-decreasing for C in this range
is immediate from the definition. To show concavity, we use a simple time-sharing argument. In
particular, pick any L < C˜ am-crr (C) and L
′ < C˜ am-crr (C ′), and suppose some r-round protocol Π =
(Π1, . . . ,Πr) has IC
ext
µ (Π) ≥ L, ICintµ (Π) ≤ C, and that some r-round protocol Π′ = (Π′1, . . . ,Π′r)
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has ICextµ (Π
′) ≥ L′ and ICintµ (Π′) ≤ C ′. For any 0 < δ < 1, construct a protocol Π′′ in which Alice,
using her private randomness, generates a bit B which is 1 with probability δ, and sends it to Bob
as part of the first message. If B = 0, Alice and Bob run the protocol Π′, and if B = 1, then Alice
and Bob run the protocol Π. Formally, we write:
Π′′i :=

(B,Πi) : i = 1, B = 1
(B,Π′i) : i = 1, B = 0
Πi : i > 1, B = 1
Π′i : i > 1, B = 0.
Then by linearity of expectation,
I(Π′′1;X|Y ) = I(B;X|Y ) + I(Π′′1;X|Y B) = I(Π′′1;X|Y B) = δ · I(Π1;X|Y ) + (1− δ) · I(Π′1;X|Y ).
and
I(Π′′1;XY ) = I(B;XY ) + I(Π
′′
1;XY |B) = δ · I(Π1;XY ) + (1− δ) · I(Π′1;XY ).
It follows in an even simpler manner that for all i,
I(Π′′i ;XY |(Π′′)i−1) = δ · I(Πi;XY |Πi−1) + (1− δ) · I(Π′i;XY |(Π′)i−1),
that for odd i ∈ [r],
I(Π′′i ;X|Y (Π′′)i−1) = δ · I(Πi;X|YΠi−1) + (1− δ) · I(Π′i;X|Y (Π′)i−1),
and for even i ∈ [r],
I(Π′′i ;Y |X(Π′′)i−1) = δ · I(Πi;Y |XΠi−1) + (1− δ) · I(Π′i;Y |X(Π′)i−1).
Thus ICintµ (Π
′′) = δ · ICintµ (Π) + (1− δ) · ICintµ (Π′) and ICextµ (Π′′) = δ · ICextµ (Π) + (1− δ) · ICextµ (Π′).
In particular,
C˜ am-crr (δC+(1−δ)C ′) ≥ C˜ am-crr (δICintµ (Π)+(1−δ)ICintµ (Π′)) ≥ δICextµ (Π)+(1−δ)ICextµ (Π′) ≥ δL+(1−δ)L′,
and taking L → C˜ am-crr (C) and L′ → C˜ am-crr (C ′) gives C˜ am-crr (δC + (1 − δ)C ′) ≥ δ · C˜ am-crr (C) +
(1− δ) · C˜ am-crr (C ′), establishing that C˜ am-crr (·) is convex on [0,Ir(X;Y )].
To complete the proof of the lemma it suffices to show that:
(1) C˜ am-crr (Ir(X;Y )) = Ir(X;Y ) + I(X;Y ), and
(2) the left-sided derivative of C˜ am-crr (C) at C = Ir(X;Y ) with respect to C is at least 1.
For statement (1) above, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 5.5. Fix a source (X,Y ) ∼ µ. Then the set T˜ of all pairs (C,L) with C,L ≥ 0, such that
there is some r-round private-coin protocol Π such that ICintµ (Π) ≤ C and ICextµ (Π) ≥ L is a closed
subset of R2.
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Proof. By the support lemma [CK81, Lemma 15.4], we can restrict our attention to protocols
Π = (Π1, . . . ,Πr) such that Πt, 1 ≤ t ≤ r, falls in a finite set of size Ut at most |X ||Y|
∏t−1
t′=1 |Ut′ |+1.
For each odd t, the space of all possible Πt is the |X | ·
∏t−1
t′=1 |Ut′ |-fold product of all probability
distributions on Ut (as Πt specifies a probability distribution on Ut for each possible value of
XΠt−1), which is compact, and in fact homeomorphic to a closed ball in some RK . We have an
analogous statement for even t, and therefore the space of all possible Π is compact. Since the
functions Π 7→ ICintµ (Π) and Π 7→ ICextµ (Π) are continuous, it follows that the set of all possible
(ICintµ (Π), IC
ext
µ (Π)) ∈ R2≥0, over all r-round protocols Π, is compact (and in particular closed).
Thus T˜ is closed as well.
By Theorem 4.1, there is a sequence (Ci, Li) with limi→∞Ci = Ir(X;Y ) and lim infi→∞ ≥
Ir(X;Y ) + I(X;Y ) such that C˜ am-crr (Ci) ≥ Li. It follows by Lemma 5.5 that C˜ am-crr (Ir(X;Y )) ≥
Ir(X;Y ) + I(X;Y ). To see that C˜ am-crr (Ir(X;Y )) ≤ Ir(X;Y ) + I(X;Y ), we note that for any
protocol Π, ICextµ (Π) ≤ ICintµ (Π) + I(X;Y ) by the data processing inequality. This establishes (1).
To show that (2) holds, consider any C < Ir(X;Y ), which implies that C˜ am-crr (C) < C +
I(X;Y ). Let Π = (Π1, . . . ,Πr) be any protocol with IC
int
µ (Π) = C and L := IC
ext
µ (Π) arbitrarily
close to C˜ am-crr (C). For any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, consider the protocol Π′ in which Alice uses private
randomness to generate a bit B ∈ {0, 1} that is 1 with probability δ and otherwise 0 and sends it to
Bob. Then, if B = 1, Alice sends Bob X and the protocol terminates (for a total of 1 ≤ r rounds),
and if B = 0, Alice and Bob simulate Π. In a similar manner as above, it is easy to see that
ICintµ (Π
′) = (1− δ)C + δ ·H(X|Y )
ICextµ (Π
′) = (1− δ)L+ δ ·H(X).
Since C < Ir(X;Y ) ≤ H(X|Y ), there is some δ ∈ (0, 1], which we denote by δ′, such that
(1 − δ)C + δ · H(X|Y ) = Ir(X;Y ). Then (1 − δ′)L + δ′ · H(X) ≤ C˜ am-crr (Ir(X;Y )). Then the
secant line of the graph of C˜ am-crr (·) between the points C and Ir(X;Y ) has slope at least
(1− δ′)L+ δ′ ·H(X)− L
(1− δ′)C + δ′ ·H(X|Y )− C =
H(X)− L
H(X|Y )− C > 1,
where the last inequality follows since I(X;Y ) > L− C by assumption that C < Ir(X;Y ).
The case r = 1 of the next lemma, Lemma 5.6 was proven as part of the proof of Theorem 4.1
in [AC98]. It is also stated without proof in [STW19]. The proof will use the following elementary
fact: the fact that Π = (Π1, . . . ,Πr) is an r-round private-coin protocol, is equivalent to the fact
that the following Markov conditions hold:
Πt −XΠt−1 − Y, t odd, X − YΠt−1 − Y, t even,
where a source (X,Y ) ∼ µ is fixed and the messages Π1, . . . ,Πr are random variables.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose that ν is a distribution with samples (XQA, Y QB) ∼ ν, where QA, QB
are uniform and independent infinite strings of bits that are independent of (X,Y ). Denote the
marginal distribution of (X,Y ) by µ. Suppose that Π is an r-round private-coin protocol with in-
puts (XQA, Y QB) ∼ ν, and write I int = ICintν (Π), Iext = ICextν (Π). Then there is a non-negative
real number α and a protocol Π′ with inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µ such that
ICextµ (Π
′) = Iext − α (14)
ICintµ (Π
′) = I int − α. (15)
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Proof. The protocol Π′ proceeds as follows: given inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µ, Alice uses her private random-
ness to generate a uniform infinite string QA independent of X and Bob does the same to generate
a uniform infinite string QB. Then certainly the resulting pair (XQA, Y QB) are distributed accord-
ing to ν. Then Alice and Bob simply run the protocol Π. Notice that the joint distribution of
((Π′)r, (QAX,QB, Y )) is identical to the joint distribution of (Πr, (QAX,QBY )).
Let Or ⊂ [r] denote the odd integers from 1 to r, and Er ⊂ [r] denote the even integers from
1 to r. That Π is a randomized (private-coin) protocol with inputs (XQA, Y QB) means that the
following Markov conditions hold:
Πi −QAXΠi−1 −QBY ∀i ∈ Or (16)
QAX −QBYΠi−1 −Πi ∀i ∈ Er. (17)
It follows immediately from (16) and (17) and the fact that QA, QB, and (X,Y ) are all inde-
pendent that the following Markov conditions also hold:
Πi −XΠi−1 − Y ∀i ∈ Or (18)
X − YΠi−1 −Πi ∀i ∈ Er. (19)
It follows from (16) and (17) and the chain rule that
ICextν (Π) =
∑
i∈Or
I(Πi;QAXQBY |Πi−1) +
∑
i∈Er
I(Πi;QAXQBY |Πi−1)
=
∑
i∈Or
I(Πi;QAX|Πi−1) +
∑
i∈Er
I(Πi;QBY |Πi−1). (20)
In a similar manner, it follows from (18) and (19) that
ICextµ (Π) =
∑
i∈Or
I(Πi;X|Πi−1) +
∑
i∈Er
I(Πi;Y |Πi−1). (21)
Thus, from (20) and (21),
ICextν (Π)− ICextµ (Π) =
∑
i∈Or
I(Πi;QA|Πi−1X) +
∑
i∈Er
I(Πi;QB|Πi−1Y ). (22)
As for internal information cost, from (16) and (17) we have
ICintν (Π) =
∑
i∈Or
I(Πi;QAX|Πi−1)− I(Πi;QBY |Πi−1) +
∑
i∈Er
I(Πi;QBY |Πi−1)− I(Πi;QAX|Πi−1),
(23)
and from (18) and (19), we have
ICintµ (Π) =
∑
i∈Or
I(Πi;X|Πi−1)− I(Πi;Y |Πi−1) +
∑
i∈Er
I(Πi;Y |Πi−1)− I(Πi;X|Πi−1), (24)
Thus, from (23) and (24),
ICintν (Π)− ICintµ (Π) =
∑
i∈Or
I(Πi;QA|Πi−1X)− I(Πi;QB|Πi−1Y )
+
∑
i∈Er
I(Πi;QB|Πi−1Y )− I(Πi;QA|Πi−1X).
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Next we claim that for all i ∈ Or, I(Πi;QB|YΠi−1) = 0 and for all i ∈ Er, I(Πi;QA|XΠi−1) = 0.
For i ∈ Or, we have
I(Πi;QB|Y,Πi−1)− I(Πi;QB|Y,Πi−1, X,QA)
= H(QB|Y,Πi−1)−H(QB|Y,Πi)−H(QB|Y,Πi−1, X,QA) +H(QB|Y,Πi, X,QA)
= I(QB;X,QA|Y,Πi−1)− I(QB;X,QA|Y,Πi).
Thus
I(Πi;QB|Y,Πi−1) = I(Πi;QB|Y,Πi−1, X,QA) + I(QB;X,QA|Y,Πi−1)− I(QB;X,QA|Y,Πi)(25)
= 0, (26)
where the first term of (25) is 0 by (16), and the second and third terms are 0 since QB ⊥ (X,QA) and
by the monotinicity of correlation property of communication protocols (this is the standard fact
that if (X,Y ) ∼ µ for some distribution µ on X ×Y, then for any t > 0, Iµ(X;Y |Πt) ≤ Iµ(X;Y )).
It follows in a similar manner that for i ∈ Er, I(Πi : QA|YΠi−1) = 0. Therefore, we obtain from
(22) and (25) that
α = ICextν (Π)− ICextµ (Π) = ICintν (Π)− ICintµ (Π) =
∑
i∈Or
I(Πi;QA|Πi−1X) +
∑
i∈Er
I(Πi;QB|Πi−1Y ).
Now we may prove the converse direction of Theorem 4.2, i.e., Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Fix a source (X,Y ) ∼ µ and any C ≥ 0. By definition of C am-crr (·), for any
L < C am-crr (C), we have that (C,L) ∈ Tr(X,Y ), i.e., there is a private-coin r-round protocol Π that
achieves the rate (C,L). As in Lemma 5.6, we interpret Π as a deterministic protocol with respect
to the tuple (XRA, Y RB) (and denote the corresponding joint distribution by ν).
Then by Lemma 5.2, for any C ′ > C and L′ < C am-crr (C), there is some N such that there
is an r-round protocol Π with inputs (XNRNA , Y
NRNB ) ∼ ν⊗N such that ICextµ⊗N (Π) ≥ L′N and
ICintµ⊗N (Π) ≤ C ′N . Then by Lemma 5.3, there is an r-round private-coin protocol Π′ for the inputs
(XRA, Y RB) ∼ ν such that ICintν (Π′) ≤ C ′ and ICextν (Π′) ≥ L′. It follows from Lemma 5.6 with
QA = RA, QB = RB that there is an r-round private-coin protocol Π
′′ for the inputs (X,Y ) ∼ µ such
that ICintµ (Π
′′) ≤ C ′ − α and ICextµ (Π′′) ≥ L′ − α, for some α ≥ 0.
By definition of C˜ am-crr (·), it follows that C˜ am-crr (C ′ − α) ≥ L′ − α. By Lemma 5.4, it follows
that C˜ am-crr (C
′) ≥ L′. By taking C ′ → C,L′ → C am-crr (C), it follows by continuity of C˜ am-crr (C)
(Lemma 5.4) that C˜ am-crr (C) ≥ L. Since L < C am-crr (C) is arbitrary, we get C˜ am-crr (C) ≥ C am-crr (C),
as desired.
6 Information Theoretic Lemmas
In this section we collect several information theoretic lemmas which are used throughout the paper.
Proposition 6.1 (Data processing inequality). If X − Y − Z is a Markov chain, then I(X;Z) ≤
I(X;Y ).
32
Lemma 6.2 ([HMO+18], Lemma 2.9). For random variables X,Y, Z,W , we have that
I(X;W |Y, Z) ≥ I(X;Y |W,Z)− I(X;Y |Z) ≥ −I(X;W |Z).
In particular,
H(W ) ≥ I(X;Y |W,Z)− I(X;Y |Z) ≥ −H(W ).
Proof. Using the definition of mutual information, we observe
I(X;W |Y,Z)− I(X;W |Z)
= H(X|Y,Z)−H(X|W,Y,Z)−H(X|Z) +H(X|W,Z)
= I(X;Y |W,Z)− I(X;Y |Z).
The claimed equalities hold by non-negativity of the mutual information.
Pinsker’s inequality gives an upper bound on total variation distance in terms of the KL diver-
gence between two distributions.
Proposition 6.3 (Pinsker’s inequality). Let µ, ν be two distributions supported on a set X . Then
∆(µ, ν) ≤
√
KL(µ||ν)
2
.
The following lemma implies that the entropy functional H(·) is continuous on the set of dis-
tributions on a finite X set with respect to the topology induced by total variation distance.
Lemma 6.4 ([HY10], Theorem 6). Suppose X1, X2 are random variables whose distributions are
supported on a set X , and let δ = ∆(X1, X2). If 0 ≤ δ ≤ |X |−1|X | , then
|H(X1)−H(X2)| ≤ h(δ) + δ log(|X | − 1).
Corollary 6.5 derives a conditional version of Lemma 6.4.
Corollary 6.5. Suppose that X1, X2 are random variables whose distributions are supported on
a set X , Y1, Y2 are random variables whose distributions are supported on a set Y, and that each
of the pairs (X1, Y1) and (X2, Y2) are jointly distributed according to some distributions. Let δ =
∆(X1Y1, X2Y2). Then
|H(X1|Y1)−H(X2|Y2)| ≤ 1 + 6δ log |X |.
Proof. For x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, write pX1Y1(x, y) for the probability of the event {X1 = x, Y1 = y}, and
similarly pX2Y2(x, y), pY1(y), pY2(y), pX1|Y1(x|y), pX2|Y2(x|y), and so on. For any y not in the support
of Y2, and any x ∈ X , we will write pX2|Y2(x|y) = H(X2|Y2 = y) = 0 as a notational convention
(and similarly for pX1|Y1(x|y), H(X1|Y1 = y) for y not in the support of Y1). Choose an arbitrary
element x∗ ∈ X , and define a random variable X˜2 with support in X that is jointly distributed
with Y1 as follows. For y in the support of Y2, let pX˜2|Y1(x|y) = pX2|Y2(x|y), for x ∈ X . For y not
in the support of Y2, let pX˜2|Y1(·|y) have all its mass on x∗ ∈ X .
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By the data processing inequality, ∆(Y1, Y2) ≤ δ, so
∆(X1Y1, X2Y2) =
1
2
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
|pX1Y1(x, y)− pX2Y2(x, y)|
=
1
2
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
|pX1|Y1(x|y)pY1(y)− pX2|Y2(x|y)pY2(y)|
=
1
2
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
|pX1|Y1(x|y)pY1(y)− pX˜2|Y1(x|y)pY2(y)|
≥ 1
2
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
pY1(y)|pX1|Y1(x|y)− pX˜2|Y1(x|y)| −
1
2
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
|pY1(y)− pY2(y)| · pX˜2|Y1(x|y)
≥ −δ + 1
2
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
pY1(y) · |pX1|Y1(x|y)− pX˜2|Y1(x|y)|,
For y ∈ Y, write δy = 12
∑
x∈X |pX1|Y1(x|y)− pX˜2|Y1(x|y)|, so that the above gives Ey∼Y1 [δy] ≤ 2δ.
Next, notice that by Ho¨lder’s inequality,
|H(X1|Y1)−H(X2|Y2)| = |Ey1∼Y1 [H(X1|Y1 = y1)]− Ey2∼Y2 [H(X2|Y2 = y2)]|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y1∈Y
pY1(y1) (H(X1|Y1 = y1)−H(X2|Y2 = y1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ 2δ · log |X |
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y1∈Y
pY1(y1)(H(X1|Y1 = y1)−H(X˜2|Y1 = y1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ 2δ · log |X |
≤ Ey1∼Y1
[
|H(X1|Y1 = y1)−H(X˜2|Y1 = y1)|
]
+ 2δ log |X |.
For each y ∈ supp(Y1), we have from Lemma 6.4 that |H(X1|Y1 = y) −H(X˜2|Y1 = y)| ≤ h(δy) +
δy log |X | as long as δy ≤ |X |−1|X | , which happens with probability at least 1 − 4δ by Markov’s
inequality. Thus,
|H(X1|Y1)−H(X2|Y2)| ≤ Ey∼Y1 [h(δy) + δy log |X |] + 4δ log |X |
≤ 1 + 6δ log |X |.
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A Non-amortized CRG
As opposed to Definition 2.3, much of the literature on the non-amortized CRG problem [BM11,
CGMS17, GR16, GJ18] has used the following definition, which only guarantees that the agreed-
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upon key is “close to uniform over a set of size 2L”, in the sense that it has min-entropy at least
L:
Definition A.1 (Non-amortized CRG (alternate definition to Definition 2.3)). For r, C ∈ N, and
L,  ∈ R≥0, we say that the tuple (C,L, ) is r-quasi-achievable from the source ν (for CRG) if
there is some N ∈ N and an r-round protocol Π with private randomness that takes as input
(XN , Y N ) ∼ ν⊗N , such that at the end of Π, Alice and Bob output keys KA,KB ∈ K, given by
deterministic functions KA = KA(X
N , RA,Π
r), KB = KB(Y
N , RB,Π
r), such that:
1. CC(Π) ≤ C.
2. min{H∞(KA), H∞(KB)} ≥ L.
3. Pν [KA = KB] ≥ 1− .
It is instructive to consider what would result if we were to change the second item in Definition
A.1 to the requirement that min{H(KA), H(KB)} ≥ L: for any L,  > 0 and any source µ, the tuple
(1, L, ) would be 1-achievable from the source µ. In other words, under this alternative definition,
Alice and Bob would be able to generate arbitrarily large amounts of common randomness with
only 1 bit of communication. To see this claim, consider the protocol where Alice uses private
randomness to generate a random bit B ∈ {0, 1} that is 1 with probability , and 0 otherwise.
Alice then sends B to Bob. Then the keys, which are elements of K := {0, 1}dL/e, are given as
follows: if B = 0, then Alice and Bob both output the string of all 0s as the key. If B = 1, then
Alice and Bob each use private randomness to choose a random element of K, and output their
respective elements as KA,KB, respectively. The probability of agreement is at least 1−  (as Alice
and Bob agree whenever B = 0), and the entropy of each of KA,KB is at least  · dL/e ≥ L.
Next we verify the simple fact that Definitions 2.3 and A.1 are essentially equivalent:
Proposition A.1. The following two statements hold:
• Suppose that Π is an r-round protocol that achieves the tuple (C,L, ) according to Definition
2.3, for some r, C, L, . Then there is an r-round protocol Π′ that quasi-achieves the tuple
(C,L, 3) in the sense of Definition A.1.
• Suppose that Π is an r-round protocol that quasi-achieves the tuple (C,L, ) according to
Definition A.1, for some r, C, L, . Then for any δ > 0, there is an r-round protocol Π′ that
achieves the tuple (C, bL− 2 log 1/δc, + δ) in the sen of Definition 2.3.
Proof. First suppose that Π is an r-round protocol achieving the tuple (C,L, ) in the sense of
Definition 2.3. Definition 2.3 gives that if KA,KB denote the parties’ keys from the protocol Π,
and if K denotes a uniformly distributed key on K, a set of size at least 2L, then ∆(KA,K) ≤ 
and ∆(KB,K) ≤ . Therefore, there are randomized functions gA : K → K and gB : K → K such
that gA(KA) and gB(KB) are distributed uniformly on K, and such that P[KA 6= gA(KA)] ≤  and
P[KB 6= gB(KB)] ≤ . By the union bound, it follows that P[gA(KA) 6= gB(KB)] ≤ 3. Certainly
H∞(gA(KA)) = H∞(gB(KB)) = L. Therefore, the protocol Π′ in which Alice and Bob run Π but
then output gA(KA), gB(KB) as their keys, respectively, quasi-achieves the tuple (C,L, 3) in the
sense of Definition A.1.
Next suppose that Π is an r-round protocol that quasi-achieves the tuple (C,L, ) in the sense
of Definition A.1. Letting KA,KB be Alice’s and Bob’s keys at the conclusion of Π, we have that
min{H∞(KA), H∞(KB)} ≥ L. We need the below lemma before continuing:
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Lemma A.2. Suppose L > 0 and 0 < δ < 1. Suppose a random variable K is distributed on a set
K so that H∞(K) ≥ L. Let K′ be a set of size b2L−log 1/δc = bδ2Lc. Then there is a deterministic
function f : K → K′ such that H(f(K)) ≥ H∞(f(K)) ≥ (log |K′|)− δ.
Proof. Pick some ordering on K, and for each k ∈ K according to this ordering, set f(k) to be the
element in K′ which has minimal probability mass assigned to it already under the distribution
of f(K). After this procedure, let k′∗ ∈ K′ have maximum probability under the distribution of
f(K), and suppose the last k ∈ K for which we set f(k) = k′ is denoted k∗. It must be the case
that P[K ∈ {k ∈ K : k 6= k∗, f(k) = k′∗}] ≤ 1/|K′| since before setting f(k) = k′∗ we had that k′∗
had minimal probability mass under all k′ ∈ K′. Since P[K = k∗] ≤ 2−L ≤ δ/|K′|, it follows that
P[f(K) = k′∗] ≤ (1 + δ)/|K′|, and so H∞(f(K)) ≥ (log |K′|)− log(1 + δ) ≥ (log |K′|)− δ.
Let K′ be a set of size b2L−log 1/δc, as in Lemma A.2. Notice that |K′| ≥ 2bL−log 1/δc. By
Lemma A.2, there is a deterministic function, fA : K → K′ such that H(fA(KA)) ≥ |K′| − δ. By
Pinsker’s inequality, it follows that if K ′ denotes the random variable that is uniformly distributed
on K′, then ∆(K ′, fA(KA)) ≤
√
δ/2. In particular, there is a coupling of K ′, fA(KA) such that
P[K ′ 6= fA(KA)] ≤
√
δ/2. Now, the protocol Π′ proceeds as follows: Alice and Bob first simulate
Π, and then output fA(KA) and fA(KB) as their keys, respectively. Since P[KA 6= KB] ≤ , we
have P[fA(KA) 6= fA(KB)] ≤  and P[K ′ 6= fA(KA)] ≤
√
δ/2, it follows by the union bound that
P[fA(KA) = fA(KB) = K ′] ≥ 1−−
√
δ/2. It follows that Π′ achieves the tuple (C, bL−log 1/δc,√δ)
in the sense of Definition 2.3; the statement of the proposition then follows by replacing δ with
δ2.
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